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raised was consistent with the prevailing philosophy of upholding the
EPA's technical pollution control regulations to the maximum extent
possible.
57
Even though courts generally handle environmental regulations with a
degree of respect, the EPA is not exempt from the requirements of the
APA. The administrative issues raised in Consolidation Coal were not
untried in the Fourth Circuit, 58 or -in other circuits. 5 The Fourth
Circuit's construction of the APA notice and comment provisions
confirmed the EPA's duty to adhere to established administrative
procedures in issuing the complex standards for water pollution control.
Circuit courts have often considered the question of extension of the
1977 statutory deadline for compliance with BPT standards. The Fourth
Circuit had traditionally defended the statutory deadline for BPT
compliance 60 and in Consolidation Coal it declined to set aside the
regulations solely on the basis of late issuance.'"' Other circuits similarly
have held that the compliance deadline is not subject to judicial
nullification. 162 Both the Sixth and the Fourth Circuits have recognized
that the Clean Water Act resolves the issue of extension. 6 3
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XIII. LABOR LAW
A. Relegating Arbitration to a Secondary Role in Labor Disputes
Section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA)'
Circuit determined from a" study of FWPCA legislative history that exemption of any. pol-
luter from the regulations is impermissible, but the court did acknowledge the need for
flexibility in applying FWPCA standards. The Third Circuit left open the question decided
in Consolidation Coal of whether location of facilities could be the basis for flexibility. Id.;
see text accompanying notes 122-30 & 148-53 supra. *
157 See, e.g., FMC Corp. v. Train, 539 F.2d 973, 979 (4th Cir. 1976); Portland Cement
Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 402 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
158 See, e.g., National Crushed Stone Ass'n v. EPA, 601 F.2d at 119; text accompanying
notes 33-51 supra.
119 See, e.g., American Iron & Steel Inst. Y. EPA, 568 F.2d at 291.
160 In Monongahela Power Co. v. EPA, 586 F.2d 318, 319 (4th Cir. 1978), the Fourth
Circuit acknowledged a split of authority on whether the 1977 deadline could be extended,
but relied on the Clean Water Act amendments to the FWPCA to resolve the controversy in
favor of discretionary extensions under prescribed circumstances. Id. See also State Water
Control Bd. v. Train, 559 F.2d 921 (4th Cir. 1977). In State Water Control Bd., the court
denied relief to a municipal petitioner that complained of a tight compliance deadline, not-
ing that the EPA has prosecutorial discretion under the FWPCA, and that courts retain
equitable discretion to determine whether to impose fines in cases of good faith inability to
comply with the deadline. Id. at 927-28.
1061 604 F.2d at 246.
162 See United States Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d,822, 854 (7th Cir. 1977); Bethlehem
Steel Corp. v. Train, 544 F.2d 657, 662 (3d Cir. 1976).
163 Monogahela Power Co. v. EPA, 586 F.2d at 319; Republic Steel Corp. v. Costle, 581
F.2d 1228, 1232 (6th Cir. 1978).
29 U.S.C. § 185(a)(1976). Section 301(a) permits suits for violation of contracts be-
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authorizes federal courts to develop substantive law to aid in the
enforcement of collective bargaining agreements between employers and
labor unions.2 The federal courts exercise the power in accordance with
section 203(d) of the LMRA,s which states that the desirable method for
settlement of disputes between management and labor is the method
agreed upon by the parties.4 The arbitration process often is incorporated
into collective bargaining agreements as a means of solving unforeseeable
disputes without interrupting business operations.5 To assure that
production is not interrupted, the employer bargains for a no-strike
clause in the collective bargaining agreement.6 The union's quid pro quo
tween an employer and a labor organization to be brought in any district court of the
United States having jurisdiction over the parties, without respect to amount in controversy
or diversity of citizenship.
2 In the landmark decision Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448
(1957), the Supreme Court construed § 301(a) to authorize federal courts to develop sub-
stantive federal law to enforce collective bargaining agreements, and to include within the
federal law specific performance of promises to arbitrate grievances under collective bar-
gaining agreements. Id. at 451. Some courts previously adopted the interpretation that
301(a) was merely a jurisdictional grant to the federal courts to enforce the procedural rules
under § 301(b), 29 U.S.C. § 185(b)(1976). See United Steelworkers v. Galland-Henning Mfg.
Co., 241 F.2d 323, 325 (7th Cir.), rev'd per curiam, 354 U.S. 906 (1957)(reversed on author-
ity of Lincoln Mills); International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. Jay-Ann Co., 228
F.2d 632, 634 (5th Cir. 1956); Mercury Oil Ref. Co. v. Oil Workers Union, 187 F.2d 980, 983
(10th Cir. 1951). The Court in Lincoln Mills rejected the limited interpretation. 353 U.S. at
150-51. As a result of the decision in Lincoln Mills, the courts are recognized as the primary
tribunal for developing a meaningful body of law to govern the interpretation and enforce-
ment of collective bargaining agreements. See Cox, Reflections Upon Labor Arbitration, 72
HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1482-89 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Cox]; Note, Arbitrability of No-
Strike Clauses, 14 SYRACUSE L. REV. 659, 659 (1963); Comment, The Lincoln Mills Case and
Specific Enforcement of No-Strike Clauses In The Federal Courts, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 496,
499-508 (1958).
3 29 U.S.C. § 173(d)(1976).
' In addition to § 203(d), § 201(b) of LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 171(b) (1976), also supports
the policy of recognizing the parties' preferences for dispute reconcilation. Section 201(b)
states that federal policy encourages settlement of differences by mutual agreement reached
through collective bargaining or by any method provided for in any applicable agreement
for settlement of disputes. Id.
I See generally Boys Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 252-53 (1970);
United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596 (A60). The Su-
preme Court, describing the importance of arbitration in United Steelworkers v. Warrior &
Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960), stated that the grievance machinery contained in
the collective bargaining agreement is the "very heart of the system of industrial self-gov-
ernment." Id. at 581. Arbitration is the means of "solving the unforeseeable" by framing a
system of private laws to remedy disputes that may arise in a manner which reconciles the
variant needs and desires of the parties. Id.; see Cox, supra note 2, at 1490-1507; Note,
Labor Injunctions, Boys Markets, and the Presumption of Arbitrability, 85 HARv. L. REV.
636, 636-42 (1972).
' See Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397, 407 (1976). In discussing
the power of the federal courts, the Supreme Court in Buffalo Forge stated that the em-
ployer would be deprived of his bargain and the benefits of the national labor policy to
implement private resolution of disputes if the federal courts could not issue injunctions to
enforce implied no-strike clauses. Id. However, in Buffalo Forge, the Court would not imply
a no-strike clause and therefore did not enjoin a sympathy strike. Id. at 412. Since the
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for conceding a no-strike clause to the employer is the right to submit
employee grievances to arbitration.7 The viability of the arbitration
process as a method for resolving disputes has prompted industry and
labor to incorporate broadly drawn grievance arbitration provisions and
no-strike agreements into collective bargaining contracts." The courts
have responded to the widespread use of the arbitration process by
adopting a presumption in favor of arbitration9 to expedite grievance
disputes. 10
agreement to arbitrate grievances and the duty not to strike usually are viewed as having co-
terminous application, the principle to quid pro quo only permits the courts to imply no-
strike clauses where the dispute is covered by the arbitration provision. Id. at 407-08. The
Court could not imply a no-strike clause in Buffalo Forge because the underlying grievance
causing the union to engage in a sympathy strike was not arbitrable. Id.
7 See United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567 (1960). In American
Mfg., the Supreme Court found that a dispute was arbitrable and therefore compelled arbi-
tration over the objections of the company. Id. at 569. The Court reasoned that there were
no exceptions to the no-strike clause and, therefore, none should be read into the arbitration
provision, since one is the quid pro for the other. Id. at 567.
a See Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368, 378-80 (1974). See also Feller, A Gen-
eral Theory of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 61 CAL. L. REV. 663, 755-60 (1973). A
good example of a broad arbitration clause is found in the National Bituminous Coal Wage
Agreement of 1968, the clause of issue in Gateway. The section describing the applicability
at the arbitration process states:
The United Mine Workers of America and operators agree and affirm that they
will maintain the integrity of this contract and that all disputes and claims which
are not settled by agreement shall be settled by the machinery provided in the
Settlement of Local and District Disputes' section of this agreement, . . it being
the purpose of this provision to provide for the settlement of all such disputes and
claims through the machinery in this contract provided and by collective bargain-
ing without recourse to the courts.
National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1968, quoted in Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW,
414 U.S. at 375 n.7.
See Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. at 368, 377-80 (1974); John Wiley & Sons,
Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 550 (1964); Pilot Freight Carriers Inc. v. International Bhd.
of Teamsters, 497 F.2d 311, 313 (4th Cir. 1974); Sam-Kane Packing Co. v. Amalgamated
Meat Cutters, 477 F.2d 1128, 1134 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1001 (1973). The Su-
preme Court first articulated the presumption of arbitrability in United States Steelworkers
v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960). In Warrior, the Court concluded that
the "particular grievance should not be denied unless it may be said with positive assurance
that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted
dispute. Doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage." Id. at 582-83. The Third Circuit in
Avco Corp. v. Local 787, UAW, 459 F.2d 968 (3d Cir. 1972), stated the fundamental reasons
supporting the federal policy in favor of arbitration. First, arbitrators are more competent
than the courts to interpret labor contracts and resolve the problems of labor management
relations. Secondly, the process of arbitration contributes to the maintenance of industrial
peace. In addition, ordering arbitration is essential in effectuating the parties' contractual
intent to settle disputes through arbitration. Fourth, a suit for damages rather than an in-
junction ordering arbitration might not repair the harm done by the strike, and might exac-
erbate labor-management strife. Id. at 973.
10 See Boys Mkts. Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 247-48 (1970). Much of
the success of the arbitration process depends on the court's role in enforcing reciprocal
agreements between employer and union. See id; text accompanying notes 41-45 infra. With
the advent of the presumption of arbitrability, the court's role in enforcing arbitration
1980]
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Although the courts are inclined to require arbitration where the
terms of the grievance procedure permit such an interpretation, a party
cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute absent such an
agreement in the contract.1 The most frequently litigated issue in
interpreting an arbitration clause is whether the subject matter of the
dispute is an arbitrable matter within the meaning of the provision. 12 The
judicial function under section 301(a) is to determine whether the party
seeking arbitration is making a claim which on its face is governed by the
arbitration clause.' 3  Accordingly, the language of the particular
arbitration provision is closely scrutinized by the court and is crucial to
the enforcement of the role of arbitration contemplated by the parties.
Another inquiry necessary to the proper functioning of the arbitration
process in the collective bargaining agreement concerns the determination
of the party responsible for invoking the process.' 4 Although most
arbitration clauses permit both parties to initiate arbitration, 5 some
agreements vest the option of invoking the arbitration process in only one
party, depending on the subject matter of the dispute.'0 The Fourth
Circuit, in Lynchburg Foundry Co. v. Patternmakers League,'7 recently
interpreted an arbitration provision where the employer was responsible
for initiating arbitration for violations of a no-strike agreement and where
clauses has expanded and thereby encouraged the quick resolution of industrial disputes
through peaceful means. See Cox, supra note 2, at 1482-89.
1' See John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 547 (1964); Boeing Co. v.
Internatonal Union, UAW, 370 F.2d 969, 970 (3d Cir. 1967); Proctor & Gamble Independent
Union v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 312 F.2d 181, 184-86 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 374
U.S. 830 (1963).
12 See Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397, 407-10 (1976); Gateway
Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368, 376 (1974); Consolidation Coal Co. v. International Union,
UAW, 537 F.2d 1226, 1231 (4th Cir. 1976); Controlled Sanitation Corp. v. District 128, Int'l
Ass'n of Machinists, 524 F.2d 1324, 1328 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 915 (1976);
Howard Elec. Co. v. IBEW Local 570, 423 F.2d 164, 166-67 (9th Cir. 1970); IIT World
Communications, Inc. v. Communication Workers, 422 F.2d 77, 78-81 (2d Cir. 1970). In
Gateway, the Supreme Court held that the presumption of arbitrability brought safety dis-
putes within the broad language of the arbitration provision at issue and therefore gave rise
to an implied no-strike clause supporting the issuance of an injunction to prevent work
stoppage. 414 U.S. at 376. The Forth Circuit, in Consolidation Coal ruled that a dispute
between an employer and members of a union who were not employees was not arbitrable
and therefore would not support the issuance of an injunction to prevent a work stoppage of
the employer's own employees. 537 F.2d at 1231.
" See United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567-68 (1960).
14 See Avco Corp. v. Local 787, UAW, 459 F.2d 968, 972-73 (3d Cir. 1972).
"' See, e.g., Drake Bakeries Inc. v. Local 50, American Bakery Workers, 370 U.S. 254,
258 (1962); Independent Oil Workers v. Mobil Oil Co., 441 F.2d 651, 652-54 (3d Cir. 1971).
" See Teledyne Wis. Motor v. Local 283, UAW, 530 F.2d 727, 732-33 (7th Cir. 1976);
Local 721 United Packinghouse Workers v. Needham Packing Co., 376 U.S. 247, 250 (1964);
cf. Black & Clawson Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists Lodge 355, 313 F.2d 179, 183-
84 (2d Cir. 1962)(union or employer may submit dispute to arbitration however employee
may not).
17 597 F.2d 384 (4th Cir. 1979).
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the union was responsible for initiating arbitration of employee grievance
disputes."'
The collective bargaining agreement between the company and the
union included both a no-strike provision and a grievance procedure for
processing employee complaints. 10 The anti-strike provision provided that
in the event of a claim by the company of a violation of the anti-strike
provision, the company "may", after notice to the union, submit the
claim to arbitration.20 The grievance provision stated that upon
completion of the last step of the grievance procedure, the union "may"
invoke arbitration. 21 The collective bargaining agreement did not contain
the usual broad provision for arbitration which permits arbitration for all
disputes as to the meaning and application of the provisions of the
agreement.
22
As a result of a strike by the union employees in alleged violation of
the anti-strike provision,23 the company brought an action seeking
damages against the national union and its local division under section
301(a). 24 The union, however, argued that the terms of the collective
18 Id. at 387.
19 Id. at 386. The no-strike clause stated, "[There will be no strikes of any kind during
this agreement. 'Strikes' includes any work stoppage, slowdown, picketing, honoring a pick-
eting line or any other concerted activity." The arbitration clause within the no-strike provi-
sion provided, "In the event of a claim by the Company of a violation of this section, written
or telegraphic notice shall be given to the Union. The Company may thereupon request the
American Arbitration Association to appoint an arbitrator to hear and decide the claim on
an emergency basis." See Brief for Appellee at 3, Lynchburg Foundry Co. v. Patternmakers
League, 597 F.2d 384 (4th Cir. 1979); cf. note 8 supra (National Bituminous Coal Wage
Agreement of 1968).
20 597 F.2d at 386.
21 Id.
22 Id.; see note 8 supra (example of the normally broad arbitration provision).
23 597 F.2d at 385-86; see note 19 supra.
24 597 F.2d at 385-86. Generally, the company, if awarded damages, would be entitled
to all expenses and losses occasioned by the violation of the no-strike clause. See Note,
Employer Remedies For Breach of No-Strike Clause, 39 IND. L. J. 387, 398-402 (1964).
Specifically, the damages have been measured in terms of loss of net profit, see Regent
Quality Furniture, Inc., 32 Lab. Arb. Rep. 553, 557-59 (1959), constant and increased over-
head costs, see Canadian Gen. Elec. Co., 18 Lab. Arb. Rep. 925, 927-29 (1952), and loss of
good will, see Oregonian Publishing Co., 33 Lab. Arb. Rep. 574, 585-87 (1959). Damages for
recovery of increased direct labor costs and losses resulting from inefficient operation caused
by the strike also have been awarded by the courts. See Operating Eng'rs Local 653 v. Bay
City Erection Co., 300 F.2d 270, 272-73 (5th Cir. 1962) (awarding losses resulting from spe-
cific inefficient operation); A.I. Gage Plumbing Supply Co. v. Local 300, Hod Carriers, 202
Cal. App. 2d 197, -, 20 Cal. Rptr. 860, 866 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962) (awarding damages for
increased labor costs). If possible, employers are required to mitigate damages. See
Brynmore Press, Inc., 7 Lab. Arb. Rep. 648, 657 (1947). Damage awards will sometimes be
reduced if the union acted in good faith reliance on the language of the contract in cases
where the language is suspectible to more than one reasonable interpretation. See In-
ternatonal Harvester Co., 14 Lab. Arb. Rep. 302, 306 (1950). Also, if the employer provoked
the strike in violation of the contract, the damages will be reduced to reflect degree of em-
ployer's responsibility for losses occasioned by the strike. See Speer Carbon Co., 16 Lab.
Arb. Rep. 247, 251 (1951). Punitive damages generally are not available in § 301(a) actions
1980]
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bargaining agreement required the employer to submit his claim to
arbitration.2" The presumption of arbitrability, contended the union,
created a reciprocal mandatory obligation to arbitrate all alleged
violations of the no-strike provision or any other provision of the
agreement.26 In addition, the union argued that the term "may" created
only the option in the employer to abandon its claim rather than submit
it to arbitration. As a result of the agreement, the union asserted that the
employer would have to submit the claim to arbitration to obtain a
resolutidn of its claim.17 The district court found in favor of the union
and struck the case from the docket without prejudice to reinstatement
after completion of the arbitration process.
2
The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's ruling and remanded
the case for trial on the breach of contract issue, finding the company's
option exclusive and that the company decided not to exercise its option
to submit the violation of the no-strike clause to arbitration. 2 The court
held that the union did not have the power to initiate arbitration to
resolve the employer's claim and that there was no obligation upon the
company to request arbitration." The Lynchburg Foundry court rejected
the union's argument that there was a reciprocal mandatory obligation to
arbitrate by distinguishing the collective bargaining agreement at issue
from one which contains a broad provision for arbitration.3 1 Assuming
that labor agreements are usually drafted very carefully, the Fourth
Circuit concluded that the general obligation probably was purposely
omitted, and therefore the presumption of arbitrability was
inapplicable.3 2
In support of its findings, the Fourth Circuit compared the wording of
the arbitration provision in the Supreme Court decision Drake Bakeries,
Inc. v. Local 50, Bakery Workers3 with the contract provision the Court
analyzed in Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co.3 4 In the two Supreme Court
cases, the employers had brought suit to collect damages for violation of a
no-strike agreement.3 5 The union responded that their respective
brought in federal court. See Local 127 United Shoe Workers v. Brooks Shoe Mfg. Co., 298
F.2d 277, 278 (3d Cir. 1962).
25 597 F.2d at 387.
26 Id.; see text accompanying notes 9 & 10 supra.
27 597 F.2d at 388.
28 Id.
29 Id.
20 Id.; see text accompanying notes 19-21 supra.
1 597 F.2d at 387; see note 8 supra.
32 597 F.2d at 387; but see, text accompanying note 80 infra.
" 370 U.S. 254 (1962).
24 370 U.S. 238 (1962).
35 Drake Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 50, Bakery Workers, 370 U.S. at 258; Atkinson v. Sin-
clair Ref. Co., 370 U.S. at 240. In Drake, the dispute arose over the company's attempt to
reschedule employees' work over Christmas holidays which the union claimed violated the
collective bargaining agreement. 370 U.S. at 256. The union allegedly encouraged employees
not to report for work because a compromise between the union and employer could not be
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collective bargaining agreements required that the employer's claims be
submitted to arbitration rather than settled by the judicial system.
3 6
While finding the broadly framed arbitration clause in Drake to
encompass the disputed matter 3 7 the Supreme Court denied access to
arbitration in Atkinson because the narrowly drawn arbitration clause
expressly limited arbitration to employee grievance claims.38 The Fourth
Circuit concluded that the arbitration provision in Lynchburg Foundry
more closely resembled that of the Atkinson case."
The Fourth Circuit acknowledged that even if the court applied the
presumption of arbitrability to the Lynchburg Foundry agreement, the
presumption would not operate to imply an agreement to arbitrate from
the existence of an obligation not to strike.' In Local 174, Teamsters v.
Lucas Flour Co.,4 1 the Supreme Court held that a contractual
commitment to submit disagreements to final and binding arbitration
gives rise to an implied obligation not to strike. 42 Application of this
judically created obligation protects the arbitration process because
enforcement of the implied no-strike clause forces the union to utilize the
arbitration process as the means to obtain a resolution of its grievance. 3
Although permitting the court to imply an agreement to arbitrate from an
agreement not to strike would encourage peaceful settlement of disputes,
a party cannot be compelled to submit to arbitration, unless he has
contracted to do so.4" Finding the language of the agreement plain and
reached. Id. In Atkinson, the dispute arose because the employer docked the pay of three
employees. 370 U.S. at 239. The union claimed that the action violated the collective bar-
gaining agreement and ordered its employees to strike. Id.
38 Drake Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 50, Bakery Workers, 370 U.S. at 258; Atkinson v. Sin-
clair Ref. Co., 370 U.S. at 240.
3' Drake Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 50, Bakery Workers, 370 U.S. at 258. The arbitration
clause at issue in Drake contained a provision which stated, "The parties agree that they
will promptly attempt to adjust all complaints, disputes or grievances arising between them
involving questions of interpretation or application of any clause or matter covered by this
contract or any act or conduct or relation between the parties, hereto, directly or indirectly."
Id. at 257.
8 Atkinson v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 370 U.S. at 241. The critical limitation imposed by the
arbitration clause at issue in Atkinson stated that local arbitration boards "shall consider
only individual or local employee or local committee grievances arising under the applica-
tion of the currently existing agreement." Id. at 243. The broad language and procedure in
the Drake clause, see note 37 supra, did not exclude submission of grievances by the com-
pany, as it did in Atkinson. Drake Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 50, Bakery Workers, 370 U.S. at
257. Therefore, in Drake, the employer's claim for damages was stayed pending arbitration
of the dispute, and, in Atkinson, the employer's claim for damages was remanded to the
district court to be litigated because the arbitration clause did not require the employer to
submit his claim to arbitration. Id. at 267; Atkinson v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 370 U.S. at 249.
39 597 F.2d at 387 n.6; see note 38 supra.
40 597 F.2d at 387.
41 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
42 Id. at 104-06; accord, Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368, 376 (1974).
4' See Boys Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 244-48 (1970); Avco
Corp. v. Local 787, UAW, 459 F.2d 968, 972 (3d Cir. 1972).
" See Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368, 374 (1974). The implied no-strike
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unambiguous, the Fourth Circuit construed the narrowly drawn
arbitration provisions as creating in each party an option to initiate
arbitration with respect to a particular subject matter.4'5 The Lynchburg
Foundry court stated the mere existence of the independent provisions
could not be the basis for inferring a reciprocal mandatory obligation to
arbitrate without destroying the intent of the parties.46
Additionally, the Fourth Circuit rejected the union's argument that
the word "may" only gave the aggrieved party the option of abandoning
his complaint or submitting a grievance to arbitration.47 The court stated
that the union's argument was valid where both parties are bound to
accept arbitration in all disputes, but was inappropriate where the option
is vested in one party.'8 The agreement in Lynchburg Foundry granted
the company the unilateral option of either submitting its claim of
alleged no-strike clause violatons to arbitration or bringing a suit for
damages in federal district court.4 The F6urth Circuit reasoned that the
discretion granted by the agreement to the company could not be
obliterated by disregarding the distinction between a mutual mandatory
obligation and a unilateral option.50 Since the company did not elect to
exercise its unilateral option to submit the claim to arbitration, the court
concluded that the district court erred in striking the claim from the
docket.5
The Fourth Circuit first utilized the Drake-Atkinson comparison to
emphasize the importance of the arbitration clause language in
determining whether the claim was an arbitrable matter within the
meaning of the arbitration provision.52 Prior to Lynchburg Foundry, the
Fourth Circuit had not construed an arbitration clause which vested the
power to invoke arbitration in the employer. The Fourth Circuit had been
confronted on several occasions, however, with the issue of whether the
express contract language creating the power to initiate arbitration in the
union prevented an employer from submitting his claim to arbitration. 3
agreement does not compel arbitration. Instead, the agreement expedites the peaceful reso-
lution of a grievance by leaving the union with the choice of abandoning its claim or submit-
ting it to arbitration. See Avco Corp. v. Local 787, UAW, 459 F.2d 968, 972-73 (3d Cir.
1972); J.C. Bonnot v. Congress of Indep. Unions Local 14, 331 F.2d 355, 359 (8th Cir. 1964).
45 597 F.2d at 387.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 388.
48 Id.
41 Id., see text accompanying notes 19-21 supra.
50 See id.
51 Id.
52 See United Textile Workers Local 120 v. Newberry Mills, Inc., 315 F.2d 217, 219 (4th
Cir. 1963).
13 See, e.g., Catbon Fuel Co. v. UMW, 582 F.2d 1346, 1349 (4th Cir. 1978); Armco Steel
Co. v. UMW, 505 F.2d 1129, 1134 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 877 (1975); Monon-
gahela Power Co. v. Local 2332, IBEW, 484 F.2d 1209, 1214 (4th Cir. 1973); H.K. Porter Co.
v. Local 37, United Steel Workers, 400 F.2d 691, 694 (4th Cir. 1968). In Monongahela, the
Fourth Circuit enjoined a work stoppage which violated the no-strike clause and ordered
that the dispute be submitted to arbitration, even though the grievance procedure was em-
ployee-oriented. 484 F.2d at 1215.
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Although a grievance procedure is employee-oriented, the Fourth Circuit
has issued an injunction, at the company's request, to enjoin strikes and
to force unions to submit grievances to arbitration.5 The Fourth Circuit's
emphasis on interpreting the specific language of the arbitration provision
in Lynchburg Foundry is contrary to previous Fourth Circuit reasoning.
In earlier cases, the Fourth Circuit relied heavily on the presumption of
arbitrability in conjunction with the quid pro quo principle55 to establish
the reciprocal mandatory obligation to arbitrate.5
The Fourth Circuit's interpretation of the company's arbitration
provision in Lynchburg Foundry is contrary to the Supreme Court's
interpretation of other arbitration provisions using similar language.5"
Reasoning that the word "may" has a meaning distinct from shall, must,
or will, 5 the Fourth Circuit interpreted the phrase, "the company may
request arbitration for violations of the no-strike clause," to provide the
company with the option of submitting the grievance to arbitration or
litigating the issue in court.59 However, the Supreme Court consistently
54 See Monongahela Power Co. v. Local 2332, IBEW, 484 F.2d 1209, 1215 (4th Cir.
1973).
:5 See text accompanying notes 6 & 7 supra.
See Armco Steel Co. v. UMW, 505 F.2d 1129, 1133 (4th Cir. 1974); Monongahela
Power Co. v. Local 2332, IBEW, 484 F.2d 1209, 1214 (4th Cir. 1973). In explaining the oper-
ation of an implied no-strike clause, the Fourth Circuit in Armco stated that when the sub-
ject of the dispute is not cognizable under the grievance arbitration provision, the quid pro
quo for the no-strike clause is no longer present and the no-strike clause does not apply. 505
F.2d at 1133. Although the Supreme Court in Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428
U.S. 397 (1976) repudiated the Fourth Circuit's assumption in Armco that a mandatory
arbitration clause implies a commitment not to engage in sympathy strikes, the court's ap-
proach in Armco was consistent with Supreme Court dictates. Id. at 408 n.10; see Gateway
Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368, 381 (1974); Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369
U.S. 95, 104-06 (1962).
" See generally text accompanying notes 59 & 60 infra.
58 597 F.2d at 387; see text accompanying notes 47 & 48 supra. To support the meaning
attributed to the word "may", the Fourth Circuit relied on the literal construction given to
the word by the governor of Pennsylvania in 1806 when interpreting the Pennsylvania Con-
stitution. Id. at 387 n.7. Considering that the Fourth Circuit's finding on this issue is crucial
to the outcome of the case, and that the court adopted a construction that is contrary to the
traditional modes of interpretation employed in deciphering the intent of the parties to a
collective bargaining agreement, the Fourth Circuit's assertion is, at best, inadequately
supported.
59 The Fourth Circuit cited Teledyne Wis. Motor v. Local 283, UAW, 386 F. Supp. 1231
(E.D. Wisc. 1975), afld., 530 F.2d 727 (7th Cir. 1976) to support the construction of the
arbitration provision that followed from the court's interpretation of the word "may." 597
F.2d at 389 n.7. In Teledyne, the district court found that a clause providing that the union
may refer grievances to arbitration would not support the company's request for ali injunc-
tion to enjoin a strike because the collective bargaining agreement did not contain an ex-
press no-strike provision. 386 F. Supp. at 1234. The court stated that the union was ndt
under an obligation to refrain from striking, and therefore a corresponding obligation to
arbitrate the grievance did not arise. Id. at 1235. However, the collective bargaining agree-
ment in Lynchburg Foundry did contain an express no-strike clause. See 597 F.2d at 386.
Therefore, the Fourth Circuit's reliance on Teledyne to support the construction of the
Lynchburg Foundry agreement is misplaced.
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has interpreted the word "may" to mean shall or will, and, therefore, has
required arbitration when a party agrees to the obligation to arbitrate
grievances and seeks to resolve a dispute.0 Since the company had the
The Fourth Circuit should have relied on Avco Corp. v. Local 787, UAW, 459 F.2d 968
(3d Cir. 1972), which the Teledyne court distinguished because the collective bargaining
agreement in Avco contained an express no-strike clause. 459 F.2d at 969 n.3. In Avco, the
arbitration clause stated that the union "may" refer employee grievances to arbitration. Id.
at 970. Although the arbitration provision in Avco only permitted the union to initiate arbi-
tration, the Third Circuit, ruled that the company's request to issue an injunction should be
granted to enjoin a strike in alleged violation of the express no-strike clause. Id. at 972. The
court reasoned that the express no-strike clause, the union's quid pro quo for the right to
submit grievances to arbitration, created a mandatory obligation to arbitrate. Id. To uphold
the efficacy of the collective bargaining process, the Avco court would not permit the union
to abandon its remedy of arbitration to disregard the no-strike clause. Id. Applying the
reasoning of Avco to Lynchburg Foundry, the Fourth Circuit should have found the use of
the word "may" irrelevant to the determination of whether the company was required to
submit the alleged no-strike clause violation to arbitration. See text accompanying note 61
& 62 infra; Amrco Steel Co. v. UMW, 505 F.2d 1129, 1132 (4th Cir. 1974).
60 See Nolde Bros. v. Local 358, Bakery Workers, 430 U.S. 243, 245 n.1, 250 (1977);
Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397, 400, 405 (1976); United Steelwork-
ers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 565 n.1, 569 (1960). In Nolde Bros., the arbitration
provision stated either party "may" demand arbitration for the resolution of any grievance
arising between the parties. 430 U.S. at 245 n.1. The Supreme Court held, over the objection
of the company, that a claim for severance pay under an expired contract was subject to
arbitration. Id. at 255. In American Mfg., the Supreme Court compelled arbitration of a
grievance, over the objection of the company, where the arbitration provision stated all dis-
putes as to the meaning and application of the collective bargaining agreement "may" be
submitted to arbitration. 363 U.S. at 569.
The Fourth Circuit distinguished the arbitration provision in Lynchburg Foundry,
where the responsibility for invoking arbitration was divided between the union and the
company depending on the subject matter of the grievance, from arbitration provisions
which stated either party "may" invoke arbitration for a grievance. 597 F.2d 388. Implicit in
the Fourth Circuit's distinction is that where either party may initiate arbitration, a dispute
will be settled through arbitration, even though the aggrieved party attempts to resolve the
claim in court, because the unaggrieved party may and will request arbitration. However,
the Fourth Circuit's reasoning is faulty because the unaggrieved party will seek to avoid
both arbitration or a judicial resolution of the aggrieved party's claim since the continuation
of the status quo will most likely benefit the unaggrieved party. Therefore, unless the court
dismisses the aggrieved party's claim, the aggrieved party will be able to avoid its contrac-
tual obligation to submit grievances to arbitration. The court's asserted distinction between
the Lynchburg Foundry provision and one in which either party may request arbitration is
without merit because in both cases the aggrieved party has the option of litigation or arbi-
tration. See 597 F.2d at 387. However, the Fourth Circuit stated, in accord with the weight
of authority, that a clause which gives either party the option to initiate arbitration gives
the aggrieved party the choice of submitting a grievance to arbitration or dropping the
claim. See id. at 388; Avco Corp. v. Local 787, UAW, 459 F.2d 968, 972 (3d Cir. 1972); J.C.
Bonnot v. Congress of Indep. Unions, 331 F.2d 355, 357 (8th Cir. 1964). To preclude the
aggrieved party's access to the court under an arbitration provision stating either party may
request arbitration, the provision must create an independent contractual obligation on the
aggrieved party to submit to arbitration. See note 59 supra. When the word "may" is inter-
preted to mean "shall," each party will be under an obligation to submit to arbitration
where the arbitration provision states either party may request arbitration. See 430 U.S. at
252; 428 U.S. at 405; 363 U.S. at 569. Therefore, the Fourth Circuit should have equated the
word "may" with "shall" in Lynchburg Foundry to hold that the arbitration provision stat-
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exclusive power to initiate arbitration for violations of the no-strike
clause in Lynchburg Foundry,"' the court should have forced the
company to initiate arbitration, or drop the claim, by dismissing the
company's suit for breach of contract, thereby precluding the company's
access to the judicial system.2
The Fourth Circuit's reliance on the Supreme Court's holding in
Atkinson,63 was incorrect because the arbitration agreement at issue is
more analogous to the provision in Drake than its counterpart in
Atkinson." The union agreed to a no-strike clause in Atkinson, and the
employer agreed to permit the union to submit employee grievances to
arbitration.6 5 The employer, in Atkinson, did not agree to become
obligated to submit company grievances to arbitration," and therefore
retained the right to have company grievances litigated in court.6 7
In Drake, however, the union agreed not to strike, and the employer
contracted to submit both employee and employer grievances to
arbitration.8 Since the parties agreed upon arbitration as the method to
resolve all disputes, 9 the company had an obligation to submit the claim
arising from the union's violation of the no-strike clause to arbitration, if
the claim was going to be pursued.70 By dismissing the suit, the Supreme
Court precluded the employer's access to the courts, thereby leaving the
employer with the option of submitting the claim to arbitration or
dropping the claim.7' If the Fourth Circuit had properly interpreted the
arbitration provision's language in Lynchburg Foundry, the company's
options would have been similarly limited.7 2
In Lynchburg Foundry, the union agreed to an express no-strike
clause and also agreed to permit the company to submit alleged no-strike
ing the company may request arbitration created an independent obligation on the company
to submit the no-strike violation to arbitration.
61 597 F.2d at 386.
62 See, e.g., note 38 supra; text accompanying note 43 supra; cf., Avco Corp. v. Local
787, UAW, 459 F.2d 968, 972-73 (3d Cir. 1972)(granting injunction would not order arbitra-
tion to occur, but would force union not strike and submit dispute to arbitration or drop it).
63 See text accompany notes 38 & 39 supra.
597 F.2d at 387 n.6; see text accompanying notes 37 & 38 supra.
65 Atkinson v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 370 U.S. at 241 n.1. see text accompanying note 38
supra.
66 Atkinson v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 370 U.S. at 241.
67 Id. at 244; see text accompanying note 38 supra.
68 Drake Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 50, Bakery Workers, 370 U.S. at 257 n.2; see text ac-
companying note 37 supra.
60 See text accompanying notes 3 & 4 supra.
70 See text accompanying note 37 supra. The Supreme Court in Drake found that the
company had an obligation to submit to arbitration where the arbitration provision stated
either party had the right to refer matters to arbitration. 370 U.S. at 261-62. Despite the
permissive connotation of the word "right," which the Fourth Circuit attached to "may,"
the Supreme Court did not consider the issue and interpreted the phrase as if the word
"shall" or "must" was used. See id. at 265-66.
71 See Drake Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 50, Bakery Workers, 370 U.S. at 265-66.
71 See note 60 supra.
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violations to arbitration.7 3 The company contracted to permit the union
to submit employee grievances to arbitration.7 4 In Drake, the arbitration
provision contained the general language that all disputes involving the
interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement may be submitted to
arbitration7 5 and, thereby, implicitly included alleged violations of the no-
strike clause. In Lynchburg Foundry, however, the company's obligation
to submit grievances, arising from violations of the no-strike clause, was
explicitly stated in a separate provision of the collective bargaining
agreement.71 In addition, the arbitration provision explicitly stated that
the issue of damages for violations of the no-strike clause should be
resolved through arbitration.7 7 Therefore, the company was contractually
bound to arbitrate no-strike clause grievances when the overall structure
of the arbitration agreement is considered.
By overemphasizing the precise meaning of the provision's language,
the Fourth Circuit misinterpreted the intent of the parties.78 Even though
the union had struck in apparent contravention of the no-strike clause in
Lynchburg Foundry,7 the Fourth Circuit should not have litigated the
merits of the company's grievance where the collective bargaining
agreement contained an arbitration clause which on its face may have
subjected the alleged no-strike violation to arbitration. 0 By not
73 597 F.2d at 386; see text accompanying notes 19 & 20 supra.
" 597 F.2d at 386; see text accompanying note 21 supra.
75 Drake Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 50, Bakery Workers, 370 U.S. at 258; see text accompa-
nying note 37 supra.
" 597 F.2d at 386; see text accompanying notes 19 & 20 supra.
" 597 F.2d at 386, see text accompanying notes 19 & 20 supra.
78 See 597 F.2d at 387; text accompanying notes 45-48 supra. The Fourth Circuit in
Lynchburg Foundry noted that labor agreements are generally drafted with extreme atten-
tion to detail. 597 F.2d at 386. The parties to the collective bargaining agreement would
have clearly prescribed their intention to make arbitration the compulsory and exclusive
remedy, asserted the court in Lynchburg Foundry, if the parties intended such a result. Id.
at 388 n.10. The Fourth Circuit's opinion is contrary to the Supreme Court's description of
collective bargaining agreements. See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation
Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578-81 (1960). In Warrior, the Court stated that a collective bargaining
agreement is a generalized code to govern a 'myriad of cases which draftsmen cannot wholly
anticipate and that there are too many unforeseeable contingencies to make the words of
the contract the exclusive source of the rights and duties. Id. at 578-79.
" The Supreme Court in Drake rejected the argument that the union's violation of the
no-strike provision constitutes a waiver of the employer's duty to arbitrate. 370 U.S. at 262.
Since the parties agreed by contract to arbitrate all claims arising under the collective bar-
gaining agreement, the Court stated that the parties negatived any intention to condition
the duty to arbitrate upon the absence of strikes. Id. at 262.
88 See text accompanying note 13 supra. The Supreme Court in United Steelworkers v.
American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960) emphasized that the courts have no business weigh-
ing the merits of the grievance, or determining whether there is particular language in the
written instrument that will support the claim. Id. at 568. The Fourth Circuit did not appy
the presumption of arbitrability because the collective bargaining agreement in Lynchburg
Foundry did not include the standard broad arbitration clause. See text accompanying
notes 8 & 22 supra. The court's reasoning was inaccurate because the broad language of the
Lynchburg Foundry arbitration clause, which requires that all disputes and claims not set-
tled by the agreement will be settled by arbitration, is only relevant to determining the
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employing the presumption of arbitrability to enforce the company's
contractual obligation to submit alleged no-strike clause violations to
arbitration,81 the Fourth Circuit endangers the efficacy of the collective
bargaining process. 8 2 As a result, unions will more frequently resort to
strikes as an economic means of resolving disputes,88 which bur national
labor policy seeks to prevent. "
NICHOLAS H. HANTZES
B. Pain and Suffering Damages Not Available Under ADEA
Congress enacted the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
(ADEA)1 to promote the employment of persons over forty years old and
to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in the employment context.' To
scope of arbitrable matters and not the issue in Lynchburg Foundry of which party is re-
sponsible for initiating arbitration. See text accompanying note 12 supra.
81 See text accompanying note 9 supra.
82 See note 10 supra.
83 The Lynchburg Foundry company brought suit for damages and has not obtained
relief through an injunction. The decision of the Supreme Court in Buffalo Forge Co. v.
United Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397 (1976) narrowed the circumstances upon which an injunc-
tion can be issued. The Supreme Court held that the strike will only be enjoined if the
underlying dispute is over an arbitrable issue within the parameters of the grievance provi-
sion of the collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 412-13; see note 6 supra. As a conse-
quence of the Buffalo Forge decision, damages are the major tool available to the courts to
enforce violations of the no-strike agreements. The Supreme Court, in Boys Mkt's. Inc. Re-
tail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970), indicated, however, that the damage remedy may
not be an adequate device for enforcing no-strike agreements because "employer's looses are
often hard to calculate and because the employer may hesitate to exacerbate relations with
the union by bringing a damage action." Id. at 248 n.17. The arbitration scheme adopted by
the parties in Lynchburg Foundry may be a reflection of the influence of the Buffalo Forge
decision. The expedited arbitration provision in Lynchburg Foundry permitted the com-
pany to obtain an arbitrator's ruling within 48 hours on whether the union's strike was over
an arbitrable matter. See Brief for Appellee at 3, Lynchburg Foundry Co. v. Patternmakers
League, 57 F.2d 384 (4th Cir. 1979). Therefore, the company could have limited the eco-
nomic loss caused by a strike. The company would have been able to obtain an injunction
within two days under Buffalo Forge, if the dispute was arbitrable. See 428 U.S. at 412-13.
If the dispute was found not to be over an arbitrable matter, the company could have con-
ceded the issue causing the dispute, depending on its ability to withstand the economic
pressure created by the strike. See Lowden & Flaherty, Sympathy Strikes, Arbitration Pol-
icy, and the Enforceability of No-Strike Agreement - An Analysis of Buffalo Forge, 45
GEO. WASH. 633, 654 (1977); see generally Gould, On Labor Injunctions Pending Arbitra-
tion Recasting Buffalo Forge, 30 STAN. L. REv. 533, 546-48 (1978).
8, See text accompanying note 4 & 5 supra.
1 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 621-634 (1976 & Supp. 1979).
'The purpose of the ADEA is to alleviate serious economic and psychological suffering
of persons within the ages of 40 and 70 caused by unreasonable prejudice and job discrimi-
nation. See H.R. REP. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. _, reprinted in [1967] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 2213, 2214. The remarks of Representative Eilberg provide a further illumina-
tion of the evils the ADEA is designed to remedy. See 113 CONG. REC. 31248 (1967). Accord-
ing to Eilberg, the cost in terms of human suffering and welfare which result from age em-
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aid in the enforcement of the ADEA, Congress granted to any person ag-
grieved by age discrimination the right to bring a private civil suit for
legal or equitable relief.3 The broad language of the civil enforcement pro-
vision of the ADEA, however, does not define the scope of the legal or
equitable relief available.
4
Due to the lack of statutory guidance from the ADEA, courts have
relied on other sources, such as analysis of Congressional intent, to deter-
mine the extent of the ADEA enforcement remedies.6 In addition, be-
cause the general enforcement provision of the ADEA incorporates en-
ployment discrimination are the primary concern of the Act, not the financial and social
cost. Id. Eilberg stated that the denial of the opportunity for a person to compete for jobs
on the basis of ability and desire solely because of age prejudice, is a most vicious, cruel and
disastrous form of inhumanity. Id. The ADEA represents congressional recognition of the
often incorrect assumptions and common misconceptions concerning the relationship of pro-
duction to age. See 113 CONG. REC. 31254, 34742, 34752 (1967). The comments of then Sec-
retary of Labor Wirtz illustrate the origin of age discrimination as distinct from other forms
of discrimination. Wirtz stated that age discrimination develops because of oversight, lack of
common sense and lack of recognition given to the capacity of an older person, whereas
racial discrimination is rooted in pure bigotry. See Hearings on the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967 Before the Subcommittee on Labor of the House Committee on
Education and Labor, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. -, (1967) (statement of Willard Wirtz). Courts
have held that the ADEA is remedial legislation and thus should be interpreted liberally to
effectuate the congressional purpose of ending age discrimination in employment. See Dartt
v. Shell Oil Co., 539 F.2d 1256, 1260 (10th Cir. 1976), aff'd., 434 U.S. 99 (1977) (equally
divided court).
3 29 U.S.C.A. § 626(c)(1) (Supp. 1979). Section 7(c) of the ADEA states: "Any person
aggrieved may bring a civil action in any court of competent jurisdiction for such legal or
equitable relief as will effectuate te purposes of this chapter. ... "
" See 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1976). Section 7(b) of the ADEA states in part:
In any action brought to enforce this chapter the court shall have jurisdiction to
grant such legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate to effectuate the pur-
poses of this chapter, including without limitation judgments compelling employ-
ment, reinstatement or promotion, or enforcing the liability for amounts deemed
to be unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation under this
section.
5 See, e.g., Walker v. Pettit Const. Co., 605 F.2d 128, 130 (4th Cir. 1979) (defendants
petition for rehearing granted); Dean v. American Sec. Ins. Co., 559 F.2d 1036, 1038-40 (5th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1066 (1978); Looney v. Commercial Union Assur. Cos., 428
F. Supp. 533, 537 (E.D. Mich. 1977). In Walker, the Fourth Circuit utilized congressional
intent as the basis for denying the award of punitive damages. The court concluded that
Congress, by providing in § 7(b), 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1976) for recovery of liquidated dam-
ages only in the cases of willful violations, evidenced an intent not to permit additional
recovery as liquidated damages. 605 F.2d 130; see Richards, Monetary Awards for Age Dis-
crimination in Employment, 30 ARK. L. R-v. 305, 327-36 (1976); Note, Rogers v. Exxon
Research & Engineering Co: Validity of Pain and Suffering Damages Award Under The
Age Discrimination In Employment Act of 1967, 26 BUFFALO L. REv. 159, 165 (1977).
6 See Vazquez v. Eastern Air Lines Inc., 579 F.2d 107, 110-11 (1st Cir. 1978); Crispen v.
Southern Cross Indus., 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 405, 406-07 (N.D. Ga. 1977); Looney v.
Commercial Union Assur. Cos., 428 F. Supp. 533, 537 (E.D. Mich. 1977); Note, Age Discrim-
ination Monetary Damages Under the Federal Age Discrimination In Employment Act, 58
NEB. L. REv. 214, 215 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Monetary Damages]; Note, Employment
Discrimination-Damages-Awarding Compensatory Damages for Pain and Suffering In Age
Discrimination Cases: A Proper Reading of the Statute, 29 S. C. L. REv. 705, 714-18 (1979).
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forcement provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA),7 the
judiciary has sought guidance from FLSA case law.' The similarity of the
substantive provisions of the ADEA and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 (Title VII)9 also has prompted the courts to obtain direction from
Title VII case law.10 Additionally, courts have analyzed the general struc-
7 .The pertinent enforcement provision of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C.A. § 216(b) (Supp. 1979),
provides that employers who violate the minimum wage or maximum hour provisions of the
FLSA are liable to the employee affected in the amount of their unpaid minimum wages, or
their unpaid overtime compensation and in an additional equal amount as liquidated dam-
ages. Id. The FLSA provision for injunctive relief, 29 U.S.C. § 217 (1976), also is incorpo-
rated into the enforcement provisions of the ADEA. Id. § 626(b). The congressional findings
and declaration of policy for the FLSA are stated in § 7(a), 29 U.S.C. § 202 (1976). The
purpose of the FLSA is to eliminate the labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of
a minimum standard of living, necessary for the health, efficiency, and general welfare of
workers. Id. Section 7(a) also lists the vices associated with sub-standard conditions, such as
unfair methods of competition in commerce, which the Act seeks to eliminate. Id. In enact-
ing the FLSA, Congress intended to protect certain groups of the population from sub-
standard wages and excessive hours. See H.R. REP. No. 2738, 75th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 13, 21,
28 (1938). Congress sought to adjust the unequal bargaining relationship between employer
and employee by preventing unconscionable private contracts between employers and the
unprotected, unorganized and lowest paid of the nation's working population. See 81 CONG.
REC. 7652, 7672, 7885 (1938); 82 CONG. REC. 1386, 1395, 1491, 1505 (1938); 83 CONG. REC.
7298, 7823, 9260, 9265 (1938).
The amendments to the FLSA implement the congressional purpose by (1) providing
an increase in the minimum wage rate, and (2) extending the benefits and protection of the
Act to workers engaged in commerce, or employed in enterprises engaged in commerce or in
the production of goods for commerce. See H.R. REP. No. 913, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. ., re-
printed in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2811, 2812.
8 See, e.g., Hays v. Republic Steel Corp., 531 F.2d 1307, 1311 (5th Cir. 1976); Rogers v.
Exxon Research & Eng'r. Co., 404 F. Supp. 324, 334 (D.N.J. 1975), rev'd on other grounds,
550 F.2d 834 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1022 (1978); Hodgson v. Ideal Corr. Box
Co., 8 Empl. Prac. Dec. 9,805 at 6371 (N.D. W.Va. 1974). In Rogers, the court explained
that the definition of the term "willful" for purposes of awarding liquidated damages under
the ADEA enforcement provisions is incorporated from the FLSA case United States v.
Illinois Central R.R., 303 U.S. 239, 242-43 (1938); 404 F. Supp. at 334. See generally Levien,
The Age Discrimination In Employment Act: Statutory Requirements and Recent Devel-
opments, 13 DuQ. L. REv. 227, 248-49 (1974); Note, Civil Procedure - Right To A Jury Trial
- Congress Intended To Grant a Jury Trial In Actions Under The ADEA Lorillard v. Pons,
62 MARQ. L. REv. 270, 273-76 (1978).
o 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976). Title VII guarantees all persons freedom from the refusal by
potential employers to hire them on account of race, color, religion, or national origin. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1976). The purpose of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e (1976), is to achieve a peaceful and voluntary settlement of unlawful discrimination
in the employment sector. See [1964] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2355. Although the Act
places primary reliance on voluntary and local solutions to claims of employment discrimi-
nation, the aggrieved party has the choice of filing civil suit on his own behalf or may file a
complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5
(1976) (enforcement provisions of the Act), [1964] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2355, 2356.
The remedies available include injunctions to enjoin unlawful employment practices, or
such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to,
reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay, or any other equitable relief
as the court may deem appropriate. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976).
10 See, e.g., Coates v. National Cash Register Co., 433 F. Supp. 655, 662 (W.D. Va.
1977). In Coates, the court, analogizing the ADEA to Title VII, found that damages for back
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ture of the ADEA enforcement provisions agaihst the general principles
of damages." Although these tools have been helpful in determining the
extent of ADEA enforcement provisions, the courts are in conflict on the
issue of whether pain and suffering damages may be awarded to remedy a
violation of the ADEA.
12
The Fourth Circuit recently addressed the ADEA damage issue in
Slatin v. Stanford Research Institute.'s The court also considered
whether a litigant under the ADEA is entitled to a jury trial in an action
for recovery of lost wages.1 4 Plaintiff Slatin was hired by the defendant,
Stanford Research Institute (SRI), on a temporary, hourly-rated basis.1 5
The plaintiff was not given permanent status, nor a regular salary due to
uncertainities concerning his qualifications and inability to meet the re-
quirements of the position." The defendant terminated the plaintiff less
than two months after he was hired, claiming that he could not ade-
quately perform the job.
17
Slatin brought suit against SRI, alleging age discrimination in viola-
tion of section 2 of the ADEA.' s The plaintiff's complaint requested va-
ried relief, including an injunction compelling reinstatement, back pay,
pay under the ADEA would have to be mitigated. Id. at 661-62. The court stated that al-
though the express language was not carried over from Title VII to the ADEA, plaintiffs
victimized by age discrimination should be treated no differently with regard to the require-
ment to mitigate damages. Id. at 662. Courts also have held that decisions interpreting the
state deference provision of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(c) (1976), generally are applicable
for purposes of interpreting the state deference provision in the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 633(b)
(1976), because of their virtually identical wording. See Curry v. Continental Airlines, 513
F.2d 691, 693 (9th Cir. 1975); Vaughn v. Chrysler Corp., 382 F. Supp. 143, 146 (E.D. Mich.
1974). But see Laughesen v. Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307, 312 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 422
U.S. 1045 (1975) (court stated law embodied in Title VII is separate and distinct from
ADEA); Vazquez v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 405 F. Supp. 1353, 1355 (D.P.R. 1975), rev'd on
other grounds, 579 F.2d 107 (1st Cir. 1978) (enforcement procedures of title VII and section
633(b) not analogous).
11 See, e.g., Rogers v. Exxon Research & Eng'r Co., 404 F. Supp. 324, 335 (D.N.J. 1975).
In Rogers, the court cited the language of the Supreme Court in Brooklyn Say. Bank v.
O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 707 (1945), as the basis for awarding an amount equal to back pay as
liquidated damages for willful violations of the ADEA. The Brooklyn Savings Bank Court
concluded that the award constitutes a congressional recognition that failure to make timely
payment of the statutory minimum is detrimental to the maintenance of a minimum stan-
dard of living and the free flow of commerce. 324 F.2d at 707. Therefore, double payment
must be made in the event of delay to restore the worker to that minimum standard of well-
being. 404 F. Supp. 335; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 339(2) (Tent. Draft No.
12, 1977); note 79 infra.
12 See text accompanying notes 51 & 52 infra.
13 590 F.2d 1292 (4th Cir. 1979).
14 Id. at 1293.




Is 590 F.2d at 1293. Under § 4 of the ADEA, 29 U.S.C.A. § 623 (1976 & Supp. 1979), it
is unlawful for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or otherwise discriminate against any
individual with respect to compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment, on
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liquidated damages, interest, attorney's fees, court costs and pain and
suffering damages.19 Slatin also requested a jury trial.20 SRI moved to
strike the request for damages for pain and suffering, on the ground that
such relief was not available under the ADEA enforcement provisions,21
and also moved to strike Slatin's request for a jury trial.22 Although the
district court denied both of defendant's motions, the court certified the
issues for interlocutory appeal.23 The Fourth Circuit subsequently
granted SRI's petition for leave to appeal.
2
4
The Fourth Circuit reversed the denial of the motion to strike the
demand for pain and suffering damages, holding that such damages are
outside the scope of ADEA remedies.2 5 The specific language of section
7(b) of the ADEA provides equitable relief in the form of judgments com-
pelling employment, reinstatement, or promotion.2" Since the legal reme-
dies provided in the ADEA enforcement provisions are back pay and liq-
uidated damages,2 7 the court reasoned that Congress intended to limit
remedies for a violation of the ADEA to those specifically enumerated in
the enforcement provision of the Act.
28
In reaching its decision, the Fourth Circuit analyzed the legislative
history of the ADEA and concluded that Congress rejected other avenues
of enforcement in favor of the selective adoption of FLSA provisions."
Reasoning that Congress must have been aware of the construction of the
the basis of age. Slatin claimed that he was hired on terms that discriminated against him
on the basis of age and also was discharged unjustifibly due to his age. See Brief for Appel-
lant at 2, Slatin v. Stanford Research Inst., 590 F.2d 1292 (4th Cir. 1979).
19 590 F.2d at 1293.
20 Id.
21 Id.; see note 4 supra.
22 590 F.2d at 1293.
22 Id. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1976), the court of appeals may, in its discretion,
review a district court determination of a question, which the district court judge deter-
mines is a controlling question of law, to which there is substantial ground for difference of
opinion, and the immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate
termination of the litigation. See id.
24 590 F.2d at 1293.
21 Id. at 1296; see text accompanying note 4 supra.
26 See 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1976).
27 See id.
28 590 F.2d at 1295-96.
29 Id.; see H.R. REP. No. 805, 90th Cong. 1st Sess. 9, reprinted in [1967] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. N.ws 2213, 2218. Congress stated that the enforcement provisions of the
amended ADEA bill follow those of the FLSA and that they replace those in the original
ADEA bill similar to the approach in the National Labor Relations Act. Id. at 9, [1967] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2218. Under the original bill, the Secretary of Labor would have
been granted the power to issue cease-and-desist orders enforceable in the courts of appeals
but no private right of action would have been available. See S. 830, H. R. 4221, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess. -, (1967); H.R. REP. No. 805, 90th Cong. 1st Sess. 5, reprinted in [1967] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2213, 2218. Thus, the enforcement provisions would have been modeled
after §§ 10(c) & (e) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 160(c), (e) (1976).
Another alternative considered by Congress adopted the statutory pattern of § 706 of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1976) and authorized the Equal
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FLSA enforcement provisions incorporated into the ADEA, the court de-
termined that cases construing the FLSA have limited damages recover-
able to those specifically enumerated therein.30 The court noted that pain
and suffering damages are not available under the FLSA enforcement
provisions.31 In addition, the Fourth Circuit relied on the Supreme Court
decision in Lorillard v. Pons,32 which stated that remedies under the
ADEA are limited to those identified in existing interpretations for viola-
tions of the FLSA.83 Consequently, the Fourth Circuit construed the gen-
eral structure of the ADEA enforcement scheme to provide adequate
means to alleviate mental anguish by allowing reimbursement and
reinstatement. 4
The Fourth Circuit also observed that awarding damages for pain and
suffering would be inconsistent with the administration of the ADEA en-
forcement scheme.35 Adopting reasoning developed by the Third Cir-
cuit,-8 the Fourth Circuit explained that the potential for large awards for
pain and suffering would induce a plaintiff to reject a reasonable settle-
ment that might be agreed upon in a conciliatory proceeding.
3 7
In addition, the award of pain and suffering damages would negate the
strong emphasis the ADEA places on resolving age discrimination claims
Employment Opportunity Commission to prosecute violations of the ADEA. See note 10
supra.
The Fourth Circuit adopted the First Circuit's reasoning that the ADEA's legislative
history reveals that Congress intentionally eschewed other avenues of enforcement in favor
of the selective adoption of FLSA provisions. See Vazquez v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 579
F.2d 107, 110 (1st Cir. 1978). In Vazquez, the court found that the statutory language cou-
pled with the congressional purpose of the ADEA, supported the correctness of limiting
damages to those provided by the FLSA. Therefore, the First Circuit held that pain and
suffering damages were not available under the Act. Id. at 112. Both circuits relied on the
remarks of Senator Javits, a major proponent of the Act, made during the floor debate on
the bill. 590 F.2d at 1295; 579 F.2d at 110. Senator Javits stated that the enforcement tech-
niques of the ADEA are directly analogous and incorporate by reference those available
under the FLSA to the greatest extent possible. See 113 CONG. Rc. 7076, 31254 (1967).
30 590 F.2d at 1295; see Vazquez v. Eastern Air Lines Inc., 579 F.2d 107, 112 (1st Cir.
1978); Martinez v. Behring's Bearings Service, Inc., 501 F.2d 104, 105 (5th Cir. 1974); Powell
v. Washington Post Co., 267 F.2d 651, 652 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 930 (1959).
" 590 F.2d at 1295; see Vazquez v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 579 F.2d 107, 110-12 (1st
Cir. 1978); Altman v. Stevens Fashion Fabrics, 441 F. Supp. 1318, 1320 (N.D. Cal. 1977)
(compensatory damages not recoverable under FLSA).
32 434 U.S. 575 (1978); see note 44 infra.
" See 434 U.S. at 578-81; note 44 infra.
" 590 F.2d at 1295; see Vazquez v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 579 F.2d 107, 112 (1st Cir.
1978); Dean v. American Sec. Ins. Co., 559 F.2d 1036, 1038 (5th Cir. 1977); Rogers v. Exxon
Research & Eng'r. Co., 550 F.2d 834, 840 (3d Cir. 1977).
3 590 F.2d at 1296; accord, Vazquez v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 579 F.2d 107, 111-112
(1st Cir. 1978); Dean v. American Sec. Ins. Co., 559 F.2d 1036, 1038-39 (5th Cir. 1977);
Rogers v. Exxon Research & Eng'r. Co., 550 F.2d 834, 841 (3d Cir. 1977); see text accompa-
nying note 28 supra.
3" See Rogers v. Exxon Research & Eng'r. Co., 550 F.2d 834, 841 (3d Cir. 1977).
37 590 F.2d at 1296; see text accompanying notes 72-76 infra. But see text accompany-
ing notes 63 & 64 infra.
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through administrative proceedings." The Fourth Circuit acknowledged
that the enforcement provisions do not indicate any standard for award-
ing damages in the administrative proceeding, which requires an evalua-
tion of subjective considerations.3 9 Rather, the ADEA provides an objec-
tive test as the basis for computing damages to avoid the uncertainties
inherent in calculating subjective damages. 40 Since the problem of ob-
taining the parties' agreement to an exact figure in calculating objective
damages is familiar to administrative proceedings, the Fourth Circuit re-
alized that the infusion of subjective considerations would interfere with
the established viability of ADEA administrative procedures.
41
Addressing the second issue in the interlocutory appeal, the Fourth
Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the motion to strike the de-
mand for a jury trial.4 2 The court noted that subsequent to certification
for appeal, the Supreme Court, in Lorillard v. Pons,43 affirmed the right
to a jury in an action under the ADEA for recovery of lost wages. 44 Addi-
tionally, Congress amended the ADEA in 1978 to provide expressly for a
590 F.2d at 1296; see Dean v. American Security Ins. Co., 559 F.2d 1036, 1038-39 (5th
Cir. 1977); Rogers v. Exxon Research & Eng'r. Co., 550 F.2d 834, 841 (3d Cir. 1977); H.R.
REP. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6, reprinted in [1967] U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEWS
2213, 2218. The House Report expresses the congressional intent that the responsibility for
enforcement, vested in the Secretary of Labor by § 7 of the ADEA, be directed initially and
exclusively through informal methods of conciliation, conference and persuasion. Id.; see
Dean v. American Sec. Ins. Co., 559 F.2d 1036, 1038 (5th Cir. 1977). The Report stated that
the Secretary must have 60 days notice of a party's intention to bring a civil suit as a condi-
tion precedent to bringing such an action. H.R. REP. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 5, re-
printed in [1967] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2213, 2218; see 559 F.2d at 1038. During the
60 days the Secretary will attempt to mediate the grievance. 559 F.2d at 1038. Additionally,
the Report stated that the enforcement power vested in the Secretary by § 7 initially will be
directed through informal methods of conciliation and, if voluntary compliance cannot be
obtained, formal methods may be applied. Id.; accord, Rogers v. Exxon Research & Eng'r
Co., 550 F.2d 834, 841 (3d Cir. 1977); Platt v. Burroughs Corp., 424 F. Supp. 1329, 1337
(E.D. Pa. 1976); Sant v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 621, 622 (N.D. Cal. 1976). But see
text accompanying notes 63 & 64 supra.
:9 590 F.2d at 1296.
0 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 1293.
43 434 U.S. 575 (1978).
4 590 F.2d at 1293. In Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575 (1978), the Supreme Court af-
firmed the Fourth Circuit's ruling that the ADEA and the seventh amendment afforded
respondent the right to a jury trial on a claim for lost wages. Id. at 576-77. The Fourth
Circuit applied the three-pronged test to determine whether a suit for lost wages under the
ADEA was recognized "at common law" as a cause of action which entitled the parties to a
jury trial under the seventh amendment. See Pons v. Lorillard, 549 F.2d 950, 953 (4th Cir.
1977). The questions considered in the three-pronged test of Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531
(1970) are whether the issue is legal rather than equitable inder the custom of the courts of
law, whether there is a legal remedy, and whether the issue is triable to a jury given jurors'
practical abilities and limitations. Id. at 538 n.10. The court found that claims of employ-
ment discrimination, coupled with a request for lost wages, were analogous to the common
law action for breach of contract by wrongful discharge or an action in tort based on the
legal duty created by the ADEA. Pons v. Lorillard, 549 F.2d at 954. Therefore, the claims
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jury trial on any issue of fact concerning the recovery of amounts owning
under section 7(b) 45 as a result of violations of the ADEA.
4
1
The Fourth Circuit's decision in Slatin resolves a conflict among the
district courts in the Fourth Circuit concerning whether pain and suffer-
ing damages were available as a remedy for violations of the ADEA. 4 7 The
lower courts denying pain and suffering damages have relied on an analy-
sis of congressional intent to support their reasoning that the ADEA en-
forcement provision is derived from selected provisions of the FLSA and,
therefore, is limited to the remedies provided in the FLSA.48 This reason-
ing reflects a preference for examining the overall effectiveness of the
ADEA enforcement scheme, rather than attaching significance to the par-
ticular language of the individual provisions."9
By relying on the case law surrounding the application of the FLSA
enforcement provisions, the Fourth Circuit's reasoning in Slatin is consis-
tent with the Supreme Court's interpretation of the legislative history of
the ADEA expressed in Pons. In Pons, the Court held that the ADEA
fully incorporates the remedies and procedures of the FLSA, with the ex-
ception of selective changes made by Congress in the ADEA provisions.5s
Additionally, the Fourth Circuit's decision to deny pain and suffering
damages in Slatin is in agreement with other circuit courts of appeal
which have decided the issue. 51
satisfied the first requirement of the test. See id. The Fourth Circuit also found that the
claim satisfied the second and third requirements of the test and, accordingly, granted the
request for a jury trial. Id. In Pons, the Supreme Court did not use a seventh amendment
analysis, basing its decision instead on the resolution of the statutory issue of whether the
structure of the Act demonstrates a congressional intent to grant a right to a jury trial. 434
U.S. at 577. Since the procedural provisions and the legislative history of the ADEA indicate
Congress's intent that the Act be enforced in accordance with the FLSA, the Court found
the right to a jury trial existed under the ADEA because the right to a jury trial was well
established for private actions pursuant to the FLSA. Id. at 580-81. See generally Wirtz v.
Jones, 340 F.2d 901, 904 (5th Cir. 1965); Olearchick v. American Steel Foundries, 73 F.
Supp. 273, 279 (W.D. Pa. 1947).
45 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1976).
" 29 U.S.C.A. § 626(c)(2) (Supp. 1979); see H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 950, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 13, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 504, 535.
" Compare Mader v. Control Data Corp., 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1192, 1194 (D. Md.
1978) (denying pain and suffering damages under ADEA); Covey v. Robert A. Johnson Co.,
19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1189, 1191 (D. Md. 1977) (same) with Coates v. National Cash Reg.
Co., 433 F. Supp. 655, 664 (N.D. Va. 1977) (permitting award of pain and suffering
damages).
" See Mader v. Control Data Corp., 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1192, 1193-94 (D. Md.
1978); Covey v. Robert A. Johnson Co., 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1188, 1189-90 (D. Md.
1977).
"' See Mader v. Control Data Corp., 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1192, 1193-94 (D. Md.
1978); Covey v. Robert A. Johnson Co., 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1188, 1189 (D. Md. 1977).
50 434 U.S. at 582.
"1 See Vazquez v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 579 F.2d 107, 110-12 (1st Cir. 1978); Dean v.
American Sec. Ins. Co., 559 F.2d 1036, 1038 (5th Cir. 1977); Rogers v. Exxon Research &
Eng'r. Co., 550 F.2d 834, 839 (3d Cir. 1977). See generally O'Donnell, Lasser, Bailor, The
Federal Age Discrimination Statute: Basic Law, Areas of Controversy, and Suggestions for
Compliance, 15 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1 (1979) (discussion of Rogers decision).
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Several district courts in other circuits, however, have awarded pain
and suffering damages. 52 The Fourth Circuit recognized that some district
courts have based the award of pain and suffering damages on the pro-
position that the ADEA creates a new statutory tort and that the exis-
tence of such a statutory right implies the existence of necessary and ap-
propriate remedies. 53 The courts have adopted the statutory language of
section 7(b) as another basis to justify their broad remedial powers under
the ADEA.5 4 Interpreting section 7(b) to provide that courts may award
such legal or equitable relief as is appropriate to effectuate the purpose of
the ADEA without limitation, courts have awarded pain and suffering
damages, reasoning that the broad language of the statute expresses Con-
gress's intent to permit such legal relief.
55
In addition, the district courts have contrasted the language of the
ADEA to that of Title VII, which permits only the award of equitable
relief, to illustrate the comprehensiveness of the ADEA's language.58 The
only limitation which the statutory language of section 7(b) places on the
forms of relief available under the ADEA is that the award of damages
may not be inconsistent with the purposes of the Act.17 Although the
52 See, e.g., Flynn v. Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., 463 F. Supp. 676, 679 (E.D.N.Y.
1979); Gifford v. B. D. Diagnostics, 458 F. Supp. 462, 464 (N.D. Ohio 1978); Bertrand v.
Orkin Ext. Co., 432 F. Supp. 952, 956 (N.D. IlM. 1977). But see Carter v. Marshall, 17 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. 1182, 1184 (D. D.C. 1978); Hannon v. Continental Nat. Bank, 427 F. Supp.
215, 217 (D. Colo. 1977); Sant v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 621, 622 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
53 See Coates v. National Cash Reg. Co., 433 F. Supp. 655, 664 (W.D. Va. 1977); Rogers
v. Exxon Research & Eng'r. Co., 404 F. Supp. 324, 330 (D. N.J. 1975). In Rogers, the district
court relied on Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 195 (1974), where the Court analogized a
claim of racial discrimination in the sale of housing under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3612 (1976), to tort actions recognized at common law. 404 F. Supp. at
327. The Supreme Court in Loether held that the statute defined a new legal duty which
authorized the Court to compensate a plaintiff for injury caused by a defendant's wrongful
breach. 415 U.S. at 195. The Rogers court relied on Sullivan v. Little Hunting. Park, Inc.,
396 U.S. 229, 239 (1969), to support the proposition that the existence of the new legal duty
sanctioned the court's broad discretion to award any necessary remedy. 404 F. Supp. at 328.
5 See Gifford v. B.D. Diagnostics, 458 F. Supp. 462, 464 (N.D. Ohio 1978); Bertrand v.
Orkin Ext. Co., 432 F. Supp. 952, 953 (N.D. Ill. 1977); 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1976).
11 See Gifford v. B.D. Diagnostics, 458 F. Supp. at 464; Bertrand v. Orkin Ext. Co., 432
F. Supp. at 953-54. But see Hassan v. Delta Orth. Medical Group, Inc., 48 U.S.L.W. 2293,
2293 (E.D. Cal. 1979). In Hassan, the court focused on § 7(c), see note 3 supra, rather than
§ 7(b), because § 7(c) is directed solely at civil actions. 48 U.S.L.W. at 2293. The court
reasoned that § 7(b) is directed to administrative and legal actions conducted by the Secre-
tary of Labor and that any limitations on the relief available under § 7(b) did not apply to
the broad language of § 7(c). Id. Pain and suffering damages were awarded by the court
because § 7(c) permits the award of any form of legal relief in civil actions. Id.
56 Compare Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1976), with §
7(b) of the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1976). See Coates v. National Cash Reg. Co., 433 F.
Supp. at 664; Rogers v. Exxon Research & Eng'r. Co., 404 F. Supp. at 328; notes 4 & 9
supra. Pain and suffering damages are a form of legal relief and, therefore, have not been
awarded by the courts in Title VII actions. See 433 F. Supp. at 664. However, since § 7(b) of
the ADEA specifically states both equitable and legal relief are available, pain and suffering
damages should be awarded in ADEA actions. See 404 F. Supp. at 327.
57 See Bertrand v. Orkin Exter. Co., 432 F. Supp. at 953; note 2 supra.
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statutory language of Title VII is not analogous to the language of the
ADEA enforcement provisions, the district courts have noted that the
ADEA substantive provisions share the make-whole purpose of Title
VII5 8 Since Congress exhibited concern for emotional and psychological
losses caused by age discrimination 9 and courts have awarded pain and
suffering damages in other discrimination contexts,6 0 courts have argued
that the award of pain and suffering damages is necessary to fulfill the
make-whole purpose of the ADEA.61
Courts have emphasized the integral part the award of pain and suf-
fering damages plays in the enforcement scheme by noting the inade-
quacy of the expressly enumerated reinstatement and back pay relief in
compensating the victim for emotional trauma.6 2 Courts also have re-
jected the argument that the award of pain and suffering damages will
interfere with conciliatory proceedings authorized by section 7(b)."
Where pain and suffering damages are not available, the employer might
be less likely to compromise the claim short of a lawsuit, because he may
realize that the most he may lose in a private suit is lost wages, possibly
doubled for willful violations.6"
'8 See Rogers v. Exxon Research & Eng'r. Co., 404 F. Supp. at 327. The Supreme Court
in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975) held that Congress's intent in
formulating the Title VII remedies, was to make persons whole for injuries sustained by
unlawful employment discrimination. Id. at 418. The Supreme Court articulated the princi-
ple for awarding relief under the make-whole purpose in Louisiana v. United States, 380
U.S. 145, 154 (1965). The injured party should be placed as near as possible, in the situation
he would have occupied if the wrong had not been committed. Id. at 154.
'9 See Flynn v. Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., 463 F. Supp. at 676, 678 (E.D. N.Y. 1979);
note 2 supra.
'0 See Rogers v. Exxon Research & Eng'r. Co., 404 F. Supp. at 330. In Humphrey v.
Southwestern Portland Cement Co., 369 F. Supp. 832 (W.D. Tex. 1973) the court awarded
damages for psychic injuries under Title VII. Id. at 835. Several circuits have awarded com-
pensatory damages for emotional distress and humiliation for discrimination in housing in
violation of Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3601-3619 (1976 & Supp.
1979). See Williams v. Matthews Co., 499 F.2d 819, 829 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1021 (1974); Jeanty v. McKey & Poague, Inc., 496 F.2d 1119, 1121 (7th Cir. 1974); Steele v.
Title Realty Co., 478 F.2d 380, 384 (10th Cir. 1973).
"1 See Flynn v. Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., 463 F. Supp. at 678-79; Gifford v. B.D.
Diagnostics, 458 F. Supp. at 464.
2 See Bertrand v. Orkin Exter. Co., 432 F. Supp. at 954. In Bertrand, the court recog-
nized that the enumerated remedies under § 7(b) of reinstatement and promotion serve
primarily to put a temporal end to the illegal conduct and an award of back pay makes a
victim financially whole. Id. at 954. Punitive damages were not recoverable under the
ADEA, according to the court, because § 7(b) provides for awarding an additional amount
equal to back pay as liquidated damages in the case of willful violations and, therefore,
fulfills the punitive function. See id. at 954-55. The court found, however, that the enumer-
ated relief did not compensate the victim for previously undergone mental trauma and so-
matic effects of the prohibited discharge. Id. at 954. But see text accompanying notes 78-86
infra.
"2 See Vazquez v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 579 F.2d 107, 111-12 (1st Cir. 1978); Flynn v.
Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., 463 F. Supp. at 679; Bertrand v. Orkin Exter. Co., 432 F. Supp.
at 955. But see text accompanying notes 35-41 supra.
" See 579 F.2d at 111-12. The First Circuit in Vazquez found statistical support for the
position that employee remedies should not be limited to promote conciliation in an annual
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The 1978 ADEA Amendment Conference Committee Report" clari-
fied the language of section 7(b) of the ADEA enforcement provision"
and thereby strengthened the Fourth Circuit's position that Congress did
not intend to provide pain and suffering damages for violations of the
ADEA. The Committee Report states that the term "amounts owing"
under the general enforcement provision is limited to items of economic
loss and liquidated damages arising out of willful violations.6 7 When the
broad language of the civil enforcement provision is considered in light of
the committee report's refinement of section 7(b),61 courts will be permit-
ted only to award relief for economic loss that will effectuate the purposes
of the Act under section 7(c). Since pain and suffering damages are not
report prepared pursuit to 29 U.S.C. § 632 (1976). 579 F.2d at 111; ADEA ANN. REP. 11
(1977). The figures indicated that attempted conciliation did not resolve the great majority
of cases brought by the Secretary of Labor and that most individuals must resort to a civil
suit to obtain relief. See 579 F.2d at 111. Although the First Circuit questioned the efficacy
of the conciliatory proceedings, the court held pain and suffering damages should not be
awarded. Id. The Vazquez court recognized the valid statutory purpose of the ADEA, to
remove employer's ignorance with respect to age discrimination prejudices, and concluded
that the enumerated remedies would fulfill this purpose. Id. at 111-12; see text accompany-
ing notes 71-76 infra.
65 H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 504, 528. The primary purpose for the 1978 legislative amendments to
the ADEA was to raise the current upper age limit of 65 in the ADEA to age 70, and protect
other workers from mandatory retirement at 65. See S. REP. No. 493, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1,
reprinted in (1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 504, 504.
66 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1976); see note 4 supra.
67 See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 13, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 504, 535. Section 7(c), 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(1) (Supp. 1979) establishes the
types of damages available in a civil suit for violations of the ADEA and should be read in
conjunction with § 7(b), 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1976), the general enforcement provision of the
ADEA.
Section 7(b), 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1976), states that "[a]mounts owing to a person,as a
result of a violation of this chapter shall be deemed to be unpaid minimum wages or unpaid
overtime compensation. . ." Id. Section 7(b), however, states that the court has jurisdiction
to grant such legal or equitable relief as will effectuate the purposes of the Act. Id. Prior to
the Committee Report, courts had focused on the term "legal relief" in § 7(b), see note 4
supra, and held that punitive and pain and suffering damages were available because they
were a form of legal relief. See Gifford v. B.D. Diagnostics, 458 F. Supp. 462, 464 (N.D. Ohio
1978); Kennedy v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 449 F. Supp. 1008, 1011 (D. Colo. 1978);
Bertrand v. Orkin Exter. Co., 432 F. Supp. 952, 956 (N.D. I1. 1977); Williams v. General
Motors Corp., 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 411, 412 (N.D. Ga. 1977). Several courts, however,
denied pain and suffering damages prior to the Committee Report. See text accompanying
notes 47 & '51 supra. The Committee Report clarified the above language by stating that
only economic loss could be included in determining the form of legal relief available within
the meaning of the term "amounts owing." See H.R. CoNF. RaP. No. 950, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 13-14, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 504, 535. The report elabo-
rated further, stating that the ADEA does not provide remedies of a punitive nature and
that liquidated damages are not a penalty but are designed to provide full compensatory
relief. Id. The Committee Report thus negates the reasoning of the courts that have
awarded punitive and pain and suffering damages because such damages are not items of
economic loss but are exemplary, in the case of punitive damages, and relief for psychologi-
cal suffering, in the case of pain and suffering damages.
61 See note 67 supra.
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awarded as relief from economic losses, the Fourth Circuit's decision in
Slatin to deny an award of pain and suffering damages is in accord with.
the Committee Report. 9
The Fourth Circuit's holding in Slatin reinforces the legislative pur-
pose of the ADEA.70 Although the award of pain and suffering damages
would be an effective and powerful tool for enforcing the remedial aspects
of the ADEA, courts which overemphasize the remedial goal when award-
ing damages act inconsistently with the expressed congressional purpose
of the Act. The legislative purpose of the ADEA is to educate the em-
ployer as to the arbitrariness of age discrimination and to discourage the
practice of age discrimination.7 1 Prior to the commencement of a private
civil suit, the claimant must give the Secretary of Labor sixty days notice
of his intent to file such action.7 2 During this time period the Secretary is
directed to attempt to eliminate any alleged unlawful practice by infor-
mal methods of conciliation, conference and persuasion.7 3 At this stage of
an ADEA action, the Secretary has the best opportunity to educate the
employer as to the needs and abilities of older workers,74 and thereby
fulfill the purpose of the Act.7 5 Since the Fourth Circuit's holding in Sla-
tin is designed to protect conciliatory proceedings,7 6 the decision ad-
vances the legislative purpose of the ADEA.
An evaluation of the overall effectiveness of the remedies specifically
enumerated in section 7 of the ADEA77 substantiates the Fourth Circuit's
conclusion that victims of age discrimination are provided with both com-
pensation for economic losses and relief from psychological suffering.
78
" See 590 F.2d at 1296. Although the Fourth Circuit in Slatin did not refer to the
Committee Report, a district court in the Fourth Circuit utilized the Committee Report as a
basis for denying punitive damages under the ADEA. Jaffee v. Plough Broad. Co., 19 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. 1194, 1195 (D. Md. 1979). Several district courts have relied on the Report
to deny pain and suffering damages. See, e.g., Brin v. Bigsby and Kruthers, 19 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. 415, 416 (N.D. Ill. 1979); Riddle v. Getty Refining & Marketing Co., 18 Fair
EmpI. Prac. Cas. 1072, 1073 (N.D. Okla. 1978).
70 See text accompanying notes 2 supra & 72 infra.
71 See 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1976) (congressional statement of findings and purpose); note 2
supra.
71 See 29 U.S.C.A. § 626(d) (Supp. 1979); note 38 supra.
71 See 29 U.S.C. 626(b) (1976).
71 See 29 U.S.C. § 622 (1976).
75 See note 71 supra.
71 590 F.2d at 1296; see Rogers v. Exxon Research & Eng'r. Co., 550 F.2d 834, 840 (3d
Cir. 1977). In Rogers, the court indicated that the educational goals of the ADEA most
likely would be obtained during the conciliatory proceedings. See id. at 841.
77 29 U.S.C.A. § 626 (1976 & Supp. 1979).
7'8 See Vazquez v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 579 F.2d 107, 112 (1st Cir. 1978); Dean v.
American Sec. Ins. Co., 559 F.2d 1036, 1038-39 (5th Cir. 1977). In Vazquez, the First Circuit
stated that Congress provided adequate means to effectuate the goal of promoting the em-
ployment of the older worker by adopting the remedies of the FLSA in § 7(b) of the ADEA,
29 U.S.C. 626(b) (1976). 579 F.2d at 112. See generally Richards, Monetary Awards for Age
Discrimination In Employment, 30 ARK. L. Rav. 305, 339, 340 (1976); Note, Damage
Remedies Under the Age Discrimination In Employment Act, 43 BROoKLYN L. Rav. 47, 70-
1 (1976).
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Since the courts have developed a broad principle to establish the ele-
ments of earnings that should be included in back pay,79 a victim is as-
sured restoration of economic security when entitled to such an award. 0
The equitable remedies of reinstatement and promotion serve to reduce
psychological suffering by removing the source of anxiety.8 1 Additionally,
victims of age discrimination are provided with relief from the economic
cost incurred through litigation expenses.82 Section 7(b) of the ADEAas
specifically incorporates section 216(b) of the FLSA s providing for rea-
sonable attorney's fees.85 Any intangible damages beyond the actual
financial damages resulting from an employer illegally withholding wages
are implicitly accounted for through the operation of the liquidated dam-
ages provision. 6 When the overall effectiveness of the statutory scheme is
considered, the Fourth Circuit's assertion that reliance on the specifically
enumerated remedies would provide adequate relief is correct.
NICHOLAS H. HANTZES
C. Statute of Limitations and the Duty of Fair Representation
A union has a judicially created obligation to fairly represent its mem-
bers in executing its statutory authorization to act as an exclusive bar-
gaining agent.1 A union breaches the duty of fair representation when a
union's conduct toward a member of the collective bargaining unit is arbi-
One commentator has'urged that a person responsible for discriminatory acts should be
liable in tort in addition to the independent statutory violation. See Duba, Damages for
Mental Suffering in Discrimination Cases, 15 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 1, 3-6 (1966). Duba ar-
gues that a cause of action arises in tort where the wrongdoers' conduct is sufficiently offen-
sive to societal norms and injurious to the victim, and that judicial notions of vindication
and making the victim whole dictate liability in the form of an intentional tort. Id.
79 See Monroe v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 335 F. Supp. 231, 234-35 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
In Monroe, the court announced the standard for measuring back pay under the ADEA. Id.
The standard requires that damages should equal the difference between the value of the
compensation by way of salary plus other specific monetary benefits to which the plaintiff
would have been entitled had he remained employed by defendant until trial date, and the
value of his total benefits and earnings at other jobs from his discharge until trial date. Id.
So See Rogers v. Exxon Research & Eng'r. Co., 404 F. Supp. 324, 330 (D. N.J. 1975);
Monetary Damages, note 6 supra, at 216-224.
:1 See Dean v. American Sec. Ins. Co., 559 F.2d 1036, 1038 (5th Cir. 1977).
82 See Brennan v. Ace Hardware Corp., 495 F.2d 368, 374 (8th Cir. 1974).
:3 29 U.S.C.A. § 626(b) (Supp. 1979).
4 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1976).
I !d.
e See 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1976); Buchholz v. Symons Mfg. Co., 445 F. Supp. 706, 713
(E.D. Wisc. 1978); Hannon v. Continental Nat'l. Bank, 427 F. Supp. 215, 218 (D. Colo.
1977); note 11 supra.
Section 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976), states
that the union shall act as the exclusive bargaining representative. The Supreme Court first
articulated the duty of fair representation in Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192
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trary, discriminatory or in bad faith.2 The federal courts have jurisdiction
under section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act to hear
suits for the breach of the duty of fair representation.$ Since section
301(a) does not designate a federal limitations period, the timeliness of an
action is determined, as a matter of federal law, by reference to the ap-
(1944). The Steele Court held that the language of the Railway Labor Act expressed Con-
gress's aim to impose on the bargaining representative the duty to exercise fairly its author-
ity on behalf of the bargaining unit for which it acts without discrimination against any
member of the unit. Id. at 202-03. In Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953), the
Supreme Court extended the duty of fair representation to § 9(a) of the National Labor
Relations Act. Id. at 337. The Supreme Court held that althopgh a union is permitted a
wide range of reasonableness in representing its members, the exercise of its discretion is
always subject to complete good faith and honesty in purpose. Id. at 337, 338. In Steele, the
Supreme Court announced the fair representation standard, requiring that the union exer-
cise its obligation "without hostile discrimination" against its members, and applied the
standard in the context of a racial discrimination suit. Id. at 202-03. The duty of fair repre-
sentation now is applied in a broad range of circumstances. See, e.g., Humphrey v. Moore,
375 U.S. 335, 350 (1964) (union has duty to fairly represent employees in collective bargain-
ing session involving merger of two union represented companies). See generally Clark, The
Duty of Fair Representation: A Theoretical Structure, 51 TEx. L. REv. 1119, 1119-26 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Clark]; Summers, The Individual Employee's Rights Under The Col-
lective Agreement: What Constitutes Fair Representation?, 126 U. PA. L. RFv. 251, 258-63
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Summers].
2 Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967). In Vaca, the Supreme Court examined the
duty of fair representation where a union had decided not to arbitrate an employee griev-
ance. Rejecting the proposition that an individual employee has an absolute right to have
his grievance taken to arbitration, Id. at 195, the Vaca Court did riot uphold the jury's
award against the union, because the plaintiff failed to prove bad faith or arbitrary conduct
on the part of the union in processing his grievance. Id. at 193. In further developing the
duty of fair representation, the Court separated the arbitrary standard from bad faith and
held that arbitrary conduct alone by a union constituted a breach. Id. at 190.
, Section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1976),
states that employees may bring a suit for breach of contract between an employer and the
union in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction over the parties. Con-
gress originally enacted § 301(a) to permit unions to sue employers for breach of collective
bargaining agreements. See Textile Wkr's Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 453 (1957).
Individual employees can also bring an action against an employer for breach of contract
under § 301(a). See Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195, 199 (1962). Additionally,
the Supreme Court, in Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964), held that a fair representa-
tion action against a union, brought in conjunction with a contract action for breach of a
collective bargaining agreement against an employer, was within the federal court's jurisdic-
tion under § 301(a). Id. at 344. Although the language of § 301 does not provide jurisdiction
for suits against the union for breach of the duty of fair representation, lower courts have
interpreted Humphrey to permit such actions. See, e.g., Bieski v. Eastern Automobile For-
warding Co., 396 F.2d 32, 34 (3d Cir. 1968). See also Bryant v. International Union, 367
F.2d 1 (6th Cir. 1972) (implicitly recognizing jurisdiction). These courts have allowed sepa-
rate fair representation actions against the union under § 301(a), by holding that rights
vested in the collective bargaining agreement underlie the claims. 396 F.2d at 34. By forcing
employees to press grievances through unfair representation suits, strong federal policy fa-
vors judicial enforcement of collective bargaining agreements. See Textile Wkr's Union v.
Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 453-54; Note, Fair Representation and Breach of Contract in
Section 301 Employer-Union Suits; Who's Watching the Back Door?, 122 U. PA. L. Rzv.
714, 716-20 (1973).
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propriate state statute of limitations. 4 When selecting the appropriate
state statute of limitations, federal courts should consider both the char-
acter of the claim involved, and the nature and purpose of the federal act
from which the claim originates.5
Federal courts have applied the state contract statutes of limitations
when an employee joins an unfair representation claim against a union
with a suit for breach of contract against an employer.6 When faced with
a separate unfair representation action against a union, however, courts
do not have the tangible collective bargaining agreement on which to rely.
Rather, the plaintiff's unfair representation claim is based on the concep-
tual nature of the duty of fair representation. Since the union's obligation
4 See UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 704-05 (1966). Rejecting the oppor-
tunity to provide a uniform limitations provision, the Supreme Court in Hoosier reasoned
that the absence of a uniform time limitation for § 301(a) actions was not a basis for infer-
ring a congressional expectation that courts would invent one. Id. at 703. By following the
long-standing policy of permitting state statutes of limitations to govern the timeliness of a
federal cause of action, see, e.g., Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. City of Atlanta, 203
U.S. 390, 397 (1906); McClaine v. Rankin, 197 U.S. 154, 158 (1905), the Hoosier Court left to
Congress the task of establishing a uniform limitation period. 383 U.S. at, 704.
The six-month statute of limitations, which governs unfair labor practice actions
brought under § 9 of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1976), has been
rejected as the governing limitation for § 301(a). See De Arroyo v. Sindicato De
Trabajadores Packinghouse, AFL-CIO, 425 F.2d 281, 287 (1st Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.
De Arroyo v. Puerto Rico Tel. Co., 400 U.S. 877 (1970); Buchholtz v. Swift & Co., 62 F.R.D.
581, 601 (D.C. Minn. 1973). The court in De Arroyo suggested that since a breach of fair
representation could constitute an unfair labor practice, courts could conceivably deem ap-
plicable the six-month period. 425 F.2d at 287. The short limitation period was rejected,
however, because federal labor policy does not require the NLRB to preempt all individual
suits that might be prosecuted under the NLRA, and the court saw no reason for limiting
private litigation by the NLRA limitation period. Id.
5 See UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 706-07 (1966). See also Barnes
Coal Corp. v. Retail Coal Merchants Ass'n, 128 F.2d 645, 647 (4th Cir. 1942) (determination
of applicable state statute of limitations in antitrust action made in light of federal act).
Where no statute is prescribed, the federal courts formulated the issue to contain both a
federal question, characterizing a cause of action, and a state question, fitting the action so
characterized into the state statutory scheme. See Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal
Law". Competence and Discretion In The Choice of National and State Rules For Deci-
sion, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 797, 810-14 (1957) (discussing factors relevant to federal courts'
selection of state laws into federal statutes); Note, Federal Statutes Without Limitation
Provisions, 53 COLUM. L. REv. 68, 69-72 (1953).
6 See Butler v. Local 823, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 514 F.2d 442, 448 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 924 (1975); Abrams v. Carrier Corp., 434 F.2d 1234, 1252 (2d Cir. 1970),
cert. denied sub nom. United Steelworkers v. Abrams, 401 U.S. 1009 (1971); Grant v. Muvi-
hill Bros. Motor Servide Inc., 428 F. Supp. 45, 48 (N.D. Ill. 1976); Buchholtz v. Swift & Co.,
62 F.R.D. 581, 604 (D. Minn. 1973). Fair representation suits often arise in conjunction with
an employee's action against an employer for breach of his employment contract. The de-
pendence of the employee on the union and the contractual relationship between the union
and the employer make it difficult for an employee to assess responsibility for his unfair
treatment. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 195-98 (1967). Thus, the aggrieved employee is
assured of redress when he joins the employer in an action for breach of the collective bar-
gaining agreement with a suit against the union for breach of the duty of fair representation.
See, e.g., Butler v. Local 823, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 514 F.2d at 447; Abrams v. Carrier
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to fairly represent members is derived wholly from judicial construction,
the nature of the duty is open to diverse interpretations among the
circuits.7
The Fourth Circuit recently confronted a claim for the breach of the
duty of fair representation in Howard v. Aluminum Workers Interna-
tional. The court was required to characterize the claim for the purpose
of selecting the appropriate statute of limitations.' The plaintiff and
thirty-three of his co-workers alleged that the union had failed to protect
their rights during collective bargaining sessions.10 The complaint also
stated that the union acted arbitrarily, discriminatorily and in bad faith
in dealing with their employer in the administration of the collective bar-
gaining agreement.1 In addition, the union members charged the union
with acting in bad faith and in an arbitrary manner in refusing to process
employee grievances.
2
In the same action, the plaintiffs also brought a claim for the denial of
free speech rights under the Labor Management Reporting and Disclo-
Corp., 434 F.2d at 1252. The primary reason for employing a contract limitation in a joint
action is that the claim against the union and employer stem from the same events and
involve the same contractual provision. 62 F.R.D. at 604. In Buchholtz, the employee as-
serted that the union's alleged improper handling of a grievance accompanied the company's
refusal to pay earned vacation wages. The court held that the contract limitation applied
because the action consisted of one gravemen grounded in the collective bargaining agree-
ment. Id.
The Butler court enumerated additional reasons for applying the written contract limi-
tations period to an unfair representation action brought in conjunction with a contract
action against the employer. 514 F.2d at 447-48. First, the Supreme Court in Vaca required
that an employee must establish that the union has breached its duty of fair representation
before he can recover from his employer. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. at 186. Therefore, the
traditional argument that the claim would be based on stale evidence if not brought within
a short period of time is not applicable. See Abrams v. Carrier Corp., 434 F.2d at 1252;
Buchholtz v. Swift & Co., 62 F.R.D. at 603. A second reason advanced by the Butler court is
that damages against the union are tied inextricably to the breach of contract. In the event
the employer has not breached the contract but the union has breached its duty of fair
representation, the possibility arises that, if a separate limitation was applied to unfair rep-
resentation actions, the employee would not be able to collect union damages flowing from
the contract breach. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. at 198. A third reason for applying a uni-
form limitation period is to enable courts to fashion a remedy which properly apportions
damages to correspond to the contributory fault of the employer and union. Id. at 187.
7 See text accompanying notes 40-47 infra.
8 589 F.2d 771 (4th Cir. 1978).
9 Id. at 773-74.
'0 Id. at 772.
" 589 F.2d at 772. Most courts require a showing of invidious discrimination or factual
malice to support a claimed breach of the duty of fair representation by a union engaged in
collective bargaining. See Jackson v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 457 F.2d 202, 204 (2d Cir.
1972) (requiring factual malice); Hiatt v. New York C.R.R., 444 F.2d 1397, 1398 (7th Cir.
1971) (something akin to factual malice); Wheeler v. Brotherhood of Loco. Firemen, 324 F.
Supp. 818, 819 (D. S.C. 1971) (requiring hostile or invidious discrimination). See generally
Clark, supra note 1. Clark suggests that courts are reluctant to limit the union's discretion
in bargaining sessions 'because the bargaining must involve frank trading to obtain realistic
terms of agreement. Id. at 1156.
2 589 F.2d at 772. The Supreme Court in Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967), stated
that evidence of arbitrary, discriminatory or bad faith handling of grievances is enough to
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sure Act (LMRDA).13 Since the LMRDA does not supply a statute of lim-
itations, the Fourth Circuit was required to select the most analogous
state limitations period by inquiring into the nature of the free speech
claim."' The employee's second charge was based on the actions of union
officials in preventing plaintiffs from speaking at a union meeting.
15
At trial, the union moved for summary judgment, claiming that Vir-
ginia's two-year statute of limitatibns applicable to personal injury ac-
tions barred the claims.' 6 Since the employees filed suit on May 12, 1976,
the union asserted that employee claims which arose before May 12, 1974
were barred by the two-year statute of limitations. 17 Alternatively, the
union argued that the three-year limitations period for oral contracts ap-
plied and operated to bar the claims arising before May 12, 1973.18 Con-
tending that Virginia's five-year limitation for actions based on written
contracts was appropriate, 9 the employees asserted that their action was
enforceable because the claim arose after May 12, 1971.20 In the alterna-
tive, the union members urged the court to adopt the Virginia five-year
limitation period governing personal actions which survive the plaintiff's
establish a breach of the duty of fair representation. Id. at 190. Most circuits have inter-
preted Vaca to hold that bad faith is not required to establish a breach in processing griev-
ances. See, e.g., Jones v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 73 Lab. Cas. 14,455 at 4671 (2d Cir.
1974) (allegation based on arbitrary conduct or not based on some rational consideration
will support claims against the union); Smith v. Pittsburgh Gage & Supply Co., 464 F.2d
870, 875 (3d Cir. 1972) (perfunctory or arbitrary handling of grievance might be sufficient
basis for breach). See text accompanying note 49 infra.
13 Id. at 772; see 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2) (1976). Congress enacted the LMRDA to guard
the union members from the tyranny of the "all-powerful labor boss." See 105 CONG. REc.
6472 (1959) (remarks of Senator McClellan). The Act seeks to provide union members with
the right to participate effectively in the internal affairs of their union. See Aaron, Labor
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 HARV. L. REV. 851, 855-66 (1960)
[hereinafter cited as Aaron]; Cox, Internal Affairs of Labor Unions Under the Labor Re-
form Act of 1959, 58 MICH. L. REv. 819, 819-23 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Internal Affairs].
Title I of the LMRDA § 101(a)(1-5), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(1-5) enumerates specific guar-
antees to all union members: equal rights and privileges in the nomination and election of
union officers, freedom of speech and assembly, freedom from arbitrary increases in dues,
fees and assessments, free access to judicial administrative and legislative processes, and
procedural due process in internal union disciplinary proceedings. The right to free speech
is articulated in § 101(a)(2) of the LMRDA, which states that members of a union shall have
the right to meet and assemble freely with other members, to express any views, and to
express his views at union meetings concerning candidates in an election of the labor organi-
zation or upon any business properly before the meeting. Id.
14 589 F.2d at 774; see text accompanying notes 4 & 5 supra & 52 infra.
'b 589 F.2d at 773.
16 Id.; see VA. CODE § 8.01-243(A) (1977). Prior to recodification in 1977, the above
section appeared as VA. CODE § 8-24 (1950).
17 Brief for Appellees at 2, Howard v. Aluminum Wkrs, 589 F.2d 771 (4th Cir. 1978).
'a Id.; see VA. CODE § 8.01-246(4) (1977). Prior to recodification in 1977, the above sec-
tion appeared as VA. CODE § 8-13 (1950).
19 Brief for Appellants at 4, Howard v. Aluminum Wkrs, 589 F.2d 771 (4th Cir. 1978);
see VA. CODE § 8.01-246(2) (1977). Prior to recodification in 1977, the above section ap-
peared as VA. CODE § 8-13 (1950).
20 Brief for Appellants at 2, Howard v. Aluminum Wkrs, 589 F.2d 771 (4th Cir. 1978).
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death.21 The district court granted the union's motion for summary judg-
ment, holding that a breach of the duty of fair representation constituted
a personal injury and, therefore, the two-year limitations period governed
the action. 22 In addition, the court found the two-year limitations period
operated to bar the plaintiff's free speech claim.
2 3
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's findings, holding that
the two-year tort limitation barred both claims.24 In affirming the lower
court's decision with respect to the unfair representation claim, the
Fourth Circuit distinguished the Howard case from its previous decision,
Kennedy v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp.2 5 In Kennedy, the Fourth
Circuit held West Virginia's oral contract statute of limitations applied to
bar an unfair representation claim against a union when joined with a
contract claim against the employer.26 The Kennedy court reasoned that
the limitations period governing the timeliness of the claim against the
union could not be longer than the period governing the claim against the
employer.17 The Fourth Circuit, in Howard, noted that other circuits also
have held that where plaintiff's bring a fair representation suit in con-
junction with a contract claim against the employer, substantial reasons
arise for concluding that the same contract limitations period should ap-
ply to both claims a.2 The circuit court reasoned that the same limitations
period should apply to both claims because the claims may be closely en-
twined.20 In addition, courts have concluded that damages against the
union are tied inextricably to the breach of contract. 0
The Fourth Circuit emphasized that no valid contract rights existed
between the employees and the union.3' Rather, the duty of the union to
fairly represent its members is implied in the statutory grant of exclusive
bargaining authority and is independent of the union's contractual duty
with the employer.3 2 The court rejected the proposition that the fiduciary
nature of the relationship between the union and its members converted
21 Id. at 4; see VA. CODE § 8.01-243(B) (1977). Prior to recodification in 1977, the above
section appeared as VA. CODE § 8-24 (1950).
22 589 F.2d at 773.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 774.
25 81 L.R.R.M. 2349 (4th Cir. 1972).
21 Id. at 2350. Even though the controversy involved rights stemming from a written
bargaining contract, the court applied the state's oral statute of limitations. The Fourth
Circuit reasoned that the action usually will involve oral individual employment contracts
and matters of proof comparable to claims on oral contracts. Id.
27 Id.
28 589 F.2d at 773; see, e.g., Butler v. Local 823, Int'l. Bhd. of Teamsters, 514 F.2d 442,
447-48 (8th Cir. 1975); Abrams v. Carrier Corp., 434 F.2d 1234, 1252 (2d Cir. 1970); see text
accompanying note 6 supra.
2' 589 F.2d at 773; see text accompanying note 6 supra.
'0 See, e.g., Butler v. Local 823, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 514 F.2d 442, 447 (8th Cir.
1975); Buchholtz v. Swift & Co., 62 F.R.D. 581, 604 (D. Minn. 1973); note 6 supra.
2" 589 F.2d at 774. But see text accompanying note 63 infra.
12 Id.; see text accompanying note 1 supra.
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the statutorily based action into a contract action." Additionally, the
Fourth Circuit reasoned that the union could not bargain away the duty
because it runs to union non-members as well as members, and, therefore,
contract principles could not govern its operation.3 4 The court concluded
that the alleged charges were not based upon a failure to perform a con-
tractual duty, but were grounded on the union's bad faith and arbitrary
manner of performance.3 5 The Fourth Circuit found that the district
33 Id. Some courts view the relationship between the union, as exclusive bargaining
agent, and the employees the union represents, as that of trustee and beneficiary. See
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768, 774 (1952); Trailmobile Co. v.
Whirls, 331 U.S. 40, 68 (1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting). The courts deem the bargaining
representative to hold the promises stated in the collective bargaining agreement as a fiduci-
ary in trust for the benefit of the union members. To enforce the provisions of the collective
bargaining agreement held in trust, the employee must prove that the union official's chal-
lenged conduct failed to comply with that required of a fiduciary. See Cox, Individual En-
forcement of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 8 LAB. L. J. 850, 853-54 (1957).
The collective bargaining agreement is not an ordinary contract but is a code to govern
the relationship between those functioning in the capacity of employer and employee. See
John Wiley & Sons Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 550 (1964). Although general areas of
agreement are delineated, it is not practicable to make the contract the exclusive source of
rights, remedies and duties. See Cox, The Legal Nature of Collective Bargaining Agree-
ments, 57 MiCH. L. REV. 1, 32 (1958). Therefore, particularly in the case of employment and
labor contracts, the existence of union duties arising outside the contract are necessary to
assure the employee adequate protection of his employment rights. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386
U.S. 171, 185-86 (1967).
-1 589 F.2d at 774; see De Arroyo v. Sindicato De Trabujadores Packinghouse, AFL-
CIO, 425 F.2d 281, 286 (1st Cir. 1970). The court in De Arroyo observed that an inequity
would result between members and non-members if the longer contract limitation was ap-
plied to unfair representation suits brought by members and the shorter tort statute of
limitations applied to the suits by non-members. Id. See also Cox, The Duty of Fair Repre-
sentation, 2 VML. L. REv. 151, 157 (1957).
3 589 F.2d at 774. One test used to distinguish between contract liability and tort lia-
bility is whether the action arises as a result of misfeasance or non-feasance on the part of
the defendant. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 92, at 613-18 (4th ed. 1971)
[hereinafter cited as PROSSER]. Misfeasance, doing an act improperly, is usually the basis for
liability in tort. Id. § 92, at 617. Non-feasance, the failure to perform an agreed-upon act, is
usually the basis for contractual liability. Id. § 92, at 614. In Howard, the Fourth Circuit
concluded that the acts the plaintiff claimed caused the breach of the duty of fair represen-
tation indicate misfeasance due to bad faith or arbitrary manner of performance. 589 F.2d
at 774.
The fundamental difference between tort and contract lies in the nature of the interests
protected. PROSSER, supra, § 92, at 613. Courts impose contract obligation because the con-
duct of the parties manifests consent, and the parties owe a duty only to specific persons
named in the contract. Id. Duties regulating conduct which give rise to tort actions are
imposed by law on a large class of parties and not necessarily based on the will of the
parties. Id. Often courts will find tortious conduct gives rise to a tort action despite the fact
that the relationship giving rise to the duty was one established by contract. See Note, The
Elastic Concept of Tort and Contract As Applied by the Courts of New York, 14 BROOKLYN
L. REV. 196, 201 (1948). To determine whether the acts of the defendant in the performance
of his contractual duties give rise to an action in tort, the inquiry is whether the defendant
has gone so far in the performance of the contract that his affirmative conduct has begun to
affect the interests of the plaintiff beyond the terms of the contract. See H.R. Mock Co. v.
Rensselear Water Co., 247 N.Y. 160, -, 159 N.E. 896, 897 (1928); W. PROSSER, The Border-
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court appropriately applied the two-year tort statute of limitations be-
cause the union's conduct gave rise to a claim analogous to an action in
tort. 6
The Fourth Circuit also affirmed the district court's dismissal of the
free speech claim under section 101(a)(2) of LMRDA.s 7 Inquiring into the
nature of the free speech claim, the Fourth Circuit noted that other
courts have found the denial of section 101(a)(2) rights similar to a per-
sonal injury under state law and have applied the tort statute of limita-
tions.38 The court, in Howard, agreed with the lower court and found the
nature of the free speech claim to be closely akin to a personal injury
claim under Virginia law. 9
Several circuits are in accord with the Fourth Circuit's decision in
land Between Tort and Contract, in SELECTED Topics ON THE LAW OF TORTS 380, 380
(1953).
To the extent that a breach of the duty of fair representation can occur from arbitrary
or negligent conduct of the union, see text accompanying note 49 infra, the courts use an
objective reasonable man standard to determine the care with which union officials must
proceed in representing employee interests. See PROSSER, supra § 132, at 150-52. The torts
that arise from the violation of a negligence standard should be distinguished from inten-
tional torts, which require a degree of subjective intent to bring about a result which will
invade the interests of another. See id. § 8, at 31. If courts required bad faith to breach the
duty of fair representation, as opposed to arbitrary conduct, a finding of subjective intent
would be necessary and therefore the duty would be more akin to an intentional tort. See
Comment, Labor Law-Negligent Failure to File a Grievance Breaches Union's Duty of Fair
Representation, 10 SUFFOLK L. REV. 642, 649 (1976).
" The court in Howard, specifically identified the similarity of the unfair representa-
tion claim to actions brought under § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1976). The court noted that the Fourth Circuit has applied the Virginia two-year tort stat-
ute of limitations to § 1983 actions. 589 F.2d at 774. See Almond v. Kent, 459 F.2d 200, 203
(4th Cir. 1972). Allegations of discriminatory treatment in an employment setting demon-
strate the similarity of unfair representation claims to § 1983 claims. Employment discrimi-
nation is actionable under the equal protection clause or the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment and therefore gives rise to a claim under § 1983. See Bireline v.
Seagondollar, 567 F.2d 260, 262-63 (4th Cir. 1977); .Wilkinson v. Hamel, 381 F. Supp. 768,
769 (W.D. Va. 1974). Where a union does not protect an employee from an employer's dis-
criminatory treatment, the employee will have a claim for the breach of the duty of fair
representation. See Griffin v. UAW, 469 F.2d at 181-83 (4th Cir. 1972); Wheeler v. Brother-
hood of Loco. Firemen, 324 F. Supp. 818, 820 (D. S.C. 1971). See also Allen v. Gifford, 462
F.2d 615, 615 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 876 (1972) (applying two-year Virginia tort
statute of limitation to a § 1982 action).
37 589 F.2d at 774; see note 10 supra.
11 589 F.2d at 774; see, e.g., Sewell v. IAM, 445 F.2d 545, 550 (5th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1024 (1972); Woods v. Local 613, IBEW, 404 F. Supp. 110, 113 (N.D. Ga.
1975). Since the basis of Sewell's grievance was the claimed denial of a right under the
LMRDA, the court concluded that the right arose from federal law rather than from a con-
tract, and therefore was a claim in the nature of tort. Id. Although the court in Sewell found
that the denial of the right to free speech under the LMRDA gives rise to liability analogous
to tort liability, the Fifth Circuit in Dantagnan v. ILA Local 1418, 496 F.2d 400 (5th Cir.
1974), limited the application of the tort limitations period to where the plaintiff sues to
restore benefits of which he was unlawfully deprived, rather than to collect damages in-
curred from the wrongful act. Id. at 403.
39 589 F.2d at 774.
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Howard characterizing the breach of the duty of fair representation as a
personal injury tort action.40 Although the tort statutes of limitations dif-
fer between the states, circuit courts have held that their respective tort
limitations periods are appropriate for an unfair representation action
against the union based on an arbitrary disposition of employee griev-
ances, even though joined with a contract action against an employer.
41
Another court has held that the tort two-year statute of limitations gov-
erns an action for breach of the duty of fair representation where physical
injury resulted from the breach.42 Two other circuits have demonstrated
an inclination to utilize the tort limitation period when adjudicating a
separate unfair representation action.43 Both courts dealt only with fair
representation suits brought in conjunction with contract actions against
the employer and applied the contract limitation.4 4 The courts stated,
however, that where an employee brings a single action for the breach of
the duty of fair representation, the courts must characterize the explicit
nature of the alleged wrong.45 The circuit courts have stressed that their
application of the contract limitation does not apply to all fair represen-
tation suits and that, in other contexts, the tort characterization or some
other characterization might be appropriate.4 6 Courts have applied stat-
utes of limitations for actions based upon liability created by statute
where the plaintiffs brought an unfair representation action against a
union in conjunction with a contract action against the employer.
47
The Fourth Circuit's decision in Howard to characterize unfair repre-
sentation as a tort also is in accord with the Fourth Circuit's analysis of
the duty of fair representation outside the statute of limitations context.
The union's duty originates independently of the contractual duties aris-
ing from the collective bargaining agreement. 48 The Fourth Circuit ad-
" See, e.g., Read v. Local 1284, IAM, 528 F.2d 823, 825 (3d Cir. 1975); Sanderson v.
Ford Motor Co., 483 F.2d 102, 114 (5th Cir. 1973); De Arroyo v. Sindicato De Trabajadores
Packinghouse, 425 F.2d 281, 287 (1st Cir. 1970). The district courts in the Fourth Circuit
which have been confronted with separate actions against the union for breach of the duty
of fair representation follow the reasoning and outcome of the Howard decision. See, e.g.,
Jamison v. Olga Coal Co., 335 F. Supp. 454, 463 (S.D. W.Va. 1971); Tippett v. Liggett &
Myers Tobacco Co., 316 F. Supp. 292, 297 (M.D. N.C. 1970).
41 See, e.g., Sanderson v. Ford Motor Co., 483 F.2d 102, 114 (5th Cir. 1973); De Arroyo
v. Sindicato De Trabajadores Packinghouse, 425 F.2d 281, 287 (1st Cir. 1970). In declining
to characterize the action for unfair representation as a contract action, the court in De
Arroyo stated, "[T]he union's duty seems more akin to, though less rigorous than, the duty
of care normally associated with tort actions." Id.
2 See Read v. Local 1284, IAM, 528 F.2d 823, 825 (3d Cir. 1973).
See Butler v. Local 823, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 514 F.2d 442, 448 (8th Cir. 1975);
Abrams v. Carrier Corp., 434 F.2d 1234, 1252 (2d Cir. 1970).
', See 514 F.2d at 445; 434 F.2d at 1239.
See 514 F.2d at 448; 434 F.2d at 1248.
514 F.2d at 448; 434 F.2d at 1248.
4 See Price v. Southern Pac. Trans. Co., 100 L.R.R.M. 2671, 2674 (9th Cir. 1978); Gray
v. International Ass'n of Heat & Frost Insulators, 416 F.2d 313, 316 (6th Cir. 1969).
48 See Griffin v. UAW, 469 F.2d 181, 184 (4th Cir. 1972). See also Hines v. Anchor
Motor Freight, Inc. 424 U.S. 554, 571 (1975). The Supreme Court in Hines addressed a
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heres to the view that negligence alone constitutes a violation of the duty
of fair representation.49 By adopting the position that arbitrary conduct
alone can constitute a violation of the duty, apart from a showing of bad
faith,50 the Fourth Circuit implicitly recognizes fair representation as an
affirmative duty on the part of the union to advance the interests of each
employee consistent with a reasonable standard of care.521 Since the duty
of fair representation arises from a voluntary relationship between a
union and its employees, is imposed by law, and prohibits negligent con-
duct by the union toward any one of a large class of employees, the
Fourth Circuit's analysis of the duty incorporates the elements of an obli-
gation classified within tort law.
52
factual situation which demonstrates the existence of the duty of fair representation apart
from the duties imposed by the collective agreement. The Supreme Court ruled in Hines
that "[tihe union's breach of [the] duty relieves the employee of an expressed or implied
requirement that disputes be settled through contractual grievance procedures. . . ." Id. at
567. Therefore, the union may be liable for a breach of fair representation independently of
a breach of the collective bargaining agreement. See id. at 571. By employing a procedural
due process argument, the Hines court illustrated that the nature of the duty of fair repre-
sentation requires the consideration of factors distinct from the terms of the collective
agreement, which merely requires compliance with the stated provisions to secure the per-
formance of contractual remedies. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 185 (1967).
The Fourth Circuit in Griffin evidenced support for the view that a breach of the duty
of fair representation is separate from the question of employer liability by holding a union
liable for breach where the union handled a grievance in an arbitrary manner. Id. at 184.
The employer was not joined because the contractual provisions were adhered to that regu-
lated the operation of the grievance process. Id. See Feller, A General Theory of the Collec-
tive Bargaining Agreement, 61 CAL. L. REv. 663, 807 (1973); Ratner, Some Contemporary
Observations on Section 301, 52 GEO. L. REv. 260, 263-66 (1964); text accompanying note 35
supra.
"I See Griffin v. UAW, 469 F.2d 181, 183 (4th Cir. 1972). After the Supreme Court's
decision in Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967), see text accompanying note 2 supra, the
circuits were divided on the issue of whether Vaca required bad faith conduct on the part of
the union in every case, or whether discriminatory, bad faith or arbitrary conduct alone
would suffice to constitute a breach of duty. Several circuit courts insisted upon a showing
of bad faith in every case. See, e.g., Local 13 ILWU v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 441 F.2d
1061, 1067 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1016 (1972); Freeman v. Grant Int'l Bhd.
Loco. Eng'rs, 375 F. Supp. 81, 93 (S.D. Ga. 1974), aff'd per curiam, 493 F.2d 628 (5th Cir.
1974). Other circuit courts require a violation of just one of the three standards: bad faith,
arbitrary or discriminatory conduct. See, e.g., Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 523 F.2d
306, 309 (6th Cir. 1975); De Arroyo v. Sindicato De Trabajadores Packinghouse, 425 F.2d
282, 284 (lst Cir. 1970). The Fourth Circuit, in Griffin expressly rejected the opportunity to
base its finding of breach on bad faith ahd adopted the arbitrariness standard as the basis
for its finding. Id. at 183. Many commentators have noted that the facts in Griffin reveal
nothing more serious than negligent handling of an employee grievance. See Clark, supra
note 1, at 1133-34; Comment, The Union's Duty of Fair Representation - Fact or Fiction,
60 MARQ. L. REv. 1116, 1130 (1977).
1o The Fourth Circuit, in Griffin v. UAW, 469 F.2d 181 (4th Cir. 1972), held that
"[w]ithout any hostile motive of discrimination and complete good faith. . .," a union may
nevertheless pursue a course of action or inaction that is so unreasonable and arbitrary as to
constitute a violation of the duty of fair representation. Id. at 183.
51 See text accompanying notes 2 & 35 supra.
2 See text accompanying note 34 supra; Developments In Law, Statutes of Limita-
tions, 63 HARV. L. REv. 1177, 1192-98 (1950) (discussing principles used by courts to select
FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
Additionally, the Fourth Circuit's decision in Howard is consistent
with Virginia courts' interpretations of that state statute of limitations.
Federal courts defer to state law to aid in the characterization of a cause
of action, unless the state characterization is inconsistent with federal
law.53 The general principles followed by Virginia courts require that the
wrong alleged, and not the form of the action, control the selection of the
limitation period.' In Virginia, a personal injury action is governed by
the two-year tort statute of limitations,"5 regardless of whether it is based
upon an alleged breach of contract or an alleged tort.58 The five-year writ-
ten contract statute of limitations57 applies where "but for" the contract,
no duty between the parties would have existed. - Considering the choice
confronting the Howard court, between contract limitations periods and
tort limitations periods, the decision was proper in light of the general
principles used by the Virginia courts for applying statutes of
limitations. 9
The Fourth Circuit's characterization of the free speech claim under
section 101(a)(2) of the LMRDA as sounding in tort is consistent with the
development, from common law to its present statutory form, of the pro-
statutes of limitations for various causes of actions); Note, A Limitation On Actions For
Deprivation of Federal Rights, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 763, 764-68 (1968) (analyzing approaches
to selection of limitations period where federal statute does not prescribe a limitation
period).
" See text accompanying note 5 supra.
" See Carva Food Corp. v. Dawley, 202 Va. 543, 546, 118 S.E.2d 664, 667 (1961); Bir-
mingham v. Chesapeake & Ohio R.C., 98 Va. 547, 548, 37 S.E. 17, 17 (1900).
" See VA. CODE § 8.01-243(A) (1977).
56 See Tyler v. R.R. Street Co., 322 F. Supp. 541, 543 (E.D. Va. 1971); Insurance Co. of
North America v. General Elec. Co., 376 F. Supp. 638, 641 (W.D. Va. 1972); Friedman v.
Peoples Serv. Drug Stores, Inc., 208 Va. 700, 703-04, 160 S.E.2d 563, 566 (1968).
"7 See VA. CODE § 8.01-246(2) (1977).
" See Comptroller of Virginia ex rel. Va. Mil. Inst. v. King, 217 Va. 751, 758-59, 232
S.E.2d 895, 899-900 (1977); Oleyar v. Keer, 217 Va. 88, 90, 225 S.E.2d 398, 402 (1976). The
Virginia Supreme Court in Keer set forth the principle which controls the selection of con-
tract statutes of limitations. The action is founded in contract rather than tort if the cause
of action is for an act of omission or non-feasance which, without the contract to establish
what is left undone, would not give rise to any cause of action. If, on the other hand, the
relation between the parties is that a duty of care arises from that relationship, irrespective
of contract, then the action is one in tort. Id. at 90; 225 S.E.2d at 399-400 (citing BURK,
PLEADINGS AND PRACTICE § 234 (4th ed. 1952)).
" Concurring only in the result in Howard, Judge Widener concluded that the timeli-
ness of the action would be governed by the one-year limitation for personal property ac-
tions that do not survive the death of the injured party. 589 F.2d at 774. When the Virginia
Code was revised in 1977, the one-year limitations period for property damage was elimi-
nated. The revised Virginia statute for survival of actions states that every legal and equita-
ble cause of action survives the death of the injured party or the defendant. See VA. CODE §
8.01-25 (1977). The revised statute of limitations provisions for personal action for injury to
property provides only a five-year limitation for such actions. See VA. CODE § 8.01-243(B)
(1977). However, the revised Virginia Code provides a general one-year limitation period for
all personal actions for which no limitation is otherwise prescribed. See VA. CODE § 8.01-248
(1977). Consequently, this catch-all provision arguably could be applied to unfair represen-
tation actions. 589 F.2d at 775 (Widener, J., concurring).
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tections afforded to union members to assure participation in union oper-
ations.60 At common law, courts equated the constitution and by-laws of
the union with terms of a contract which members accepted upon joining
the organization.6 ' Therefore, the union's obligation to protect members'
free speech rights arose from the contract and thus the contract statutes
of limitations governed.6 2 Inequities resulted from courts' strict adherence
to the union's by-laws causing the courts to recognize the public posture
of a labor union and the concomitant inherent constitutional rights that
extended to union members.6 By relying on protections arising outside
the contractual obligations, the federal courts reasoned that the union's
violation of the members' free speech rights sounded in tort.
6
4
Congress enacted section 101(a)(2) of the LMRDA to reinforce the ex-
ternal standards of conduct imposed on union officials in the performance
An obstacle to the application of the one-year limitations period is Van Horn v.
Lukhard, 392 F. Supp. 384 (E.D. Va. 1975), which was the basis for repealing the Virginia
one-year limitation applicable to property tort actions. Id. at 388. The Van Horn court held
that the one-year property tort limitation was unconstitutional when applied to civil rights
cases under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). Id. at 388. The court found the one-year limitation
unconstitutional because it burdened the assertion of a federally created right of substantial
importance. Id. at 389. The Van Horn court, reimposed the prior rule of the Fourth Circuit
that the two-year limitation applicable to personal injury torts applies to civil rights claims.
Id. at 391.
The district court in Van Horn reasoned that the determination of whether the one-
year limitation period impermissibly burdened a federally created right demanded an as-
sessment of the relative importance of policies underlying § 1983. Id. at 389. The court
found the one-year limitation emasculated the broad, comprehensive and remedial protec-
tions envisioned by the Act. Id. at 390. Other federal rights that are of "substantial impor-
tance" include the right to vote, the right to free speech and the right to be free from invidi-
ous discrimination. Id. In Brown v. Blake & Bane, Inc., 409 F. Supp. 1246 (E.D. Va. 1976),
the court, relying on Van Horn, held the one-year limitation an impermissible burden on
the enforcement of § 1982 rights. 409 F. Supp. at 1248. Applying the reasoning of the Van
Horn decision to an unfair representation suit., the argument clearly could be made that the
right to fair representation is of "substantial importance" and the application of a one-year
limitation would burden the assertion of a federally created right. The duty of fair represen-
tation is of equal importance to other paramount federal rights because it protects individu-
als' economic livelihood.
60 See generally Beaird & Player, Free Speech and the Landrum-Griffin Act, 25 ALA.
L. RE V. 577, 581-93 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Beard & Player]; Summers, Legal Limita-
tions On Union Discipline, 64 HARV. L. REv. 1049, 1050-59 (1951).
61 See Porth v. Carpenters Local 201, 171 Kan. 177, _; 231 P.2d 252, 254 (1951); De
Mille v. American Fed'n of Radio Artists, 31 Cal. 2d 139, -, 187 P.2d 769, 774 (1947); Polin
v. Kaplan, 257 N.Y. 277, 281, 177 N.E. 833, 834 (1931).
62 See text accompanying note 58 supra.
63 See Crossen v. Duffy, 90 Ohio App. 252, -, 103 N.E.2d 769, 777 (1951). In Duffy, the
court stated that union members retain their constitutional right to freedom of speech
within a union because unions play a pivotal role in special relation to their members and to
the state. Id.; see Madden v. Atkins, 4 N.Y.2d 283, 293, 151 N.E.2d 73, 78 (1958). But see
Winter v. Local 1639, Int'l.. Bhd. of Teamsters, 569 F.2d 146, 149 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (by-laws
and constitution create a contract even after enactment of LRMDA); Orphan v. Furnco
Construction Corp., 466 F.2d 795, 801 (7th Cir. 1972) (same).
6" See text accompanying notes 26, 35 & 58 supra.
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of the organization's administrative affairs.6 5 To the extent that courts
place exclusive reliance on the federal statute and not the implied con-
tract created by the union by-laws, the denial of the section 101(a)(2)
right is analogous to tort liability, and therefore the two-year tort statute
of limitations should govern.
Constitutional considerations provide additional support for the
Fourth Circuit's decision to apply the two-year statute of limitations
rather than the one-year limitation for personal actions which do not sur-
vive the plaintiff's death. If the court applied a one-year limitation to the
free speech claim, an impermissible burden would be placed on a federal
right of substantial importance.6 8 Not only is the substantial importance
of the right to free speech in union affairs confirmed by its origin in the
first amendment of the Constitution,6 7 but the courts have given broader
protection to section 101(a)(2) rights than the first amendment rights.
Consequently, a court's finding that a member's rights would be unduly
burdened by a short limitations period" would be substantially
supported.
The duty of fair representation and the right to free speech under the
LMRDA are judicially enforced safeguards designed to protect individual
employees from abuse of a union's power. 9 However, excessive judicial
intervention on behalf of individuals can weaken the union's institutional
strength."' The Fourth Circuit's decision in Howard to apply the tort two-
year statute of limitations to claims brought separately against unions for
unfair representation, 71 and to claims for the denial of free speech rights
"' See Internal Affairs, supra note 10, at 831. Cox noted the important role of the
government in enforcing democratic procedures in internal union affairs. He stated that the
task of assuring workers the ultimate control of the union affairs should be undertaken by
the law because the law gives a union the quasi-legislative power to bind employees in the
bargaining court without their consent. Id. at 30; Aaron, supra note 10, at 855.
0' See note 54 supra.
67 U.S. CONST. amend. I; see note 59 supra.
" The only potential limitation on union members' otherwise absolute right to free
speech is the proviso to section 101(a)(2) of the LMRDA. The proviso states that the exer-
cise of the freedom of speech cannot impair the right of a labor organization to enforce
reasonable rules as to the responsibility of every member toward the organization as an
institution. Also, the exercise of free speech cafinot impair the union's right to require mem-
bers to refrain from conduct that would interfere with the performance of its legal or con-
tractual obligations. 29 U.S.C. 411(a)(2) (1976). But the courts have been reluctant to deny
free speech rights in favor or upholding the institutional strength of the union. See, e.g.,
Salzhandler v. Caputo, 316 F.2d 445, 451 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 946 (1963). See
also, Fulton Lodge 2, IAM v. Nix, 415 F.2d 212, 217-18 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 406
U.S. 946 (1972); International Bhd. of Boilermakers v. Rafferty, 348 F.2d 307, 311-14 (9th
Cir. 1965). The only limitation on the exercise of section 101(a)(2) free speech rights recog-
nized by the courts is that a president of a union can summarily discharge for disloyalty,
appointed union officials who are responsible for implementing presidential policy. See
Newman v. Local 1101, Communications Wkrs, 570 F.2d 439, 444-45 (2d Cir. 1978); Wam-
bles v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 488 F.2d 888, 890 (5th Cir. 1974). But see, Bradford
v. Textile Wkrs, 563 F.2d 1138, 1141-42 (4th Cir. 1977).
9 See text accompanying notes 1 & 10 supra.
70 See Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 563-64 (1976); Clark, supra
note 2, at 1120-21; Beaird & Player, supra note 59, at 579-81.
71 589 F.2d at 774.
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under the LMRDA,7 2 preserves a delicate balance between union strength
and individual employee rights.
As a result of the Howard decision, the Fourth Circuit will apply a
different statute of limitations to a claim for unfair representation de-
pending on whether the employee alleges a contract claim against the em-
ployer in the same suit." By acknowledging the substantial reasons for
applying the contract limitations period uniformly to the claim against
the employer in a joint action,7 4 the Fourth Circuit demands the parties'
adherence to the collective bargaining agreement, and thereby protects
individual employee rights.7 5 The susceptibility of the union to liability
for five years rather than two years in a joint action does not jeopardize
the union's institutional strength, because the union assumes the respon-
sibility for administering the collective bargaining agreement when it ne-
gotiates with the employer on behalf of the employees.7 6 The members'
claim in a separate action for the breach of the duty of fair representation
usually is unrelated to the collective bargaining agreement.
7
Although the Fourth Circuit did not rely on the labor contract in
Howard, the application of the two-year tort statute of limitations will
provide an equitable balance between union strength and individual em-
ployee rights. The two-year statute of limitations will limit the potential
for excessive union liability posed by the Fourth Circuit's application of
the negligence standard to violations of the duty of fair representation.76
By applying the two-year tort statute of limitations rather than a five-
year contract limitations period to the free speech claim under the
LMRDA, the Fourth Circuit has provided a procedural limitation on the
union's liability which compensates for the inadequate restriction the
proviso in section 101(a)(2) is supposed to impose substantively.7 9
NICHOLAS H. HANSTzE
72 Id.
73 See text accompanying note 26 supra.
74 589 F.2d at 773, see text accompanying note 6 supra.
7' An employee's claim for unfair representation based on the union's failure to admin-
ister the collective bargaining agreement in good faith arises because the union is compro-
mising the rights guaranteed to employees in the labor agreement. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386
U.S. 171, 184-87 (1967); Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 342 (1964). Assuming the collec-
tive bargaining agreement accepted by the employees reflects an equitable balancing of com-
peting employee interests, judicial enforcement of the agreement will preserve the balance
between individual rights and union strength. See Summers, Individual Rights In Collective
Agreements and Arbitration, 37 N.Y.U. L. REv. 362, 389-90 (1962); Dunau, Employee Par-
ticipation In the Grievance Aspect of Collective Bargaining, 50 COLUM. L. REv. 731, 747-51
(1950).
16 See § 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159(A) (1976). See also,
Summers, supra note 1, at 254-57.
77 See Hill v. Iron Wkr's., Local 125, 520 F.2d 40, 41 (6th Cir. 1975); Adamszewski v.
Local 1487 IAM, 496 F.2d 777, 780 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 997 (1974); Nedd v.
UMW, 400 F.2d 103, 105-06 (3d Cir. 1968).
78 See text accompanying note 49 supra.
71 See note 68 supra.
